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1 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT CASE FOR 
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 
By John D. Moore* 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., this article makes the case for extending First 
Amendment religious protections to for-profit corporations. It argues that logical 
application of the First Amendment allows for no other result. The article then 
proposes a novel framework—deeply rooted in existing First Amendment law—
for determining which corporations are actually engaged in religious practice. 
Rather than focusing on profit motives or ownership structure, courts deciding 
corporate religious claims should extend First Amendment protection to those 
corporations that have demonstrated sincere religious beliefs through their cor-
porate charter and practices. By tackling this controversial problem head-on and 
offering a workable middle-ground approach to resolving the controversy, this 
article offers valuable tools to courts considering corporate free exercise cases 
and to scholars discussing these issues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the moment the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear religious 
challenges to the Affordable Care Act in the Hobby Lobby case, there was little 
question that this case was going to be the “blockbuster” of the 2013 term.1 The 
case brought together issues considered in the Court’s controversial Citizens 
United ruling—affirming corporate personhood2—and its equally controversial 
2012 ruling upholding the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (also 
known as “Obamacare”).3 The Court considered whether a corporation could 
assert religious rights and decline to provide contraceptive coverage for em-
ployees as required under Obamacare. As one commentator wrote in anticipa-
tion of the Court’s ruling, the case could “prove to be an unholy alliance of 
corporate personhood doctrine, religious freedom claims, and abortion rights.”4 
When the Court ruled—upholding certain religious rights for corporations—
public reaction was swift and dramatic. Newspaper editorial boards across the 
country alternately praised and condemned the decision in sweeping terms.5 
                                                        
1  Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the 
Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 273 
(2014). 
2  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 311 (2010). 
3  See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
4  Dahlia Lithwhick, Corporations Are People, the Biblical Sequel, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013, 
3:25 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/11/supreme_ 
court_and_obamacare_contraception_mandate_are_companies_persons.html. 
5  Compare Editorial, High Court Ruling a Win for Hobby Lobby, Religious Liberty, DAILY 
OKLAHOMAN, July 1, 2014, http://newsok.com/high-court-ruling-a-win-for-hobby-lobby-
religious-liberty/article/4984227 (“In ruling on the side of Hobby Lobby, the U.S. Supreme 
Court struck a welcome blow for religious liberty, which the Obama administration put in 
the cross hairs by inserting a misguided contraceptive mandate in the president’s health care 
law.”), Editorial, “A Victory for Freedom,” AUGUSTA CHRON., June 30, 2014, http://chron 
icle.augusta.com/opinion/editorials/2014-06-30/victory-freedom (“If you like your religious 
freedoms, you can keep them. For now.”), and Editorial, Justices Strike A Sound Balance in 
Hobby Lobby Ruling, NEWSDAY, June 30, 2014, http://www.newsday.com /opinion/justices-
strike-a-sound-balance-in-hobby-lobby-ruling-editorial-1.8619295 (“Abortion and Obamac-
are are an explosive mix but the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have charted a viable course 
through this minefield on Monday.”), with Editorial, Limiting Rights: Imposing Religion on 
Workers, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/opinion/the-
supreme-court-imposing-religion-on-workers.html (“The Supreme Court’s deeply dismaying 
decision on Monday in the Hobby Lobby case . . . grant[s] owners of closely held, for-profit 
companies an unprecedented right to impose their religious views on employees.”), Kevin 
Horrigan, Editorial, In Hobby Lobby, Court Rules Some Beliefs Are More Equal Than Oth-
ers, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 30, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/col 
umns/the-platform/editorial-in-hobby-lobby-court-rules-some-beliefs-are-more/.html (“The 
Supreme Court has decided that the rights of free exercise of religion held by corporate citi-
zens can preempt the beliefs of employees.”), and Editorial, Corporations Trump People in 
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Beneath the uproar and partisan posturing surrounding the decision, the 
Court addressed a set of very real and difficult legal questions: Can for-profit 
corporations exercise religion? Does the contraception mandate substantially 
burden the exercise of religion? If there is a burden, does the government have 
the right to impose that burden anyway? 
In its decision, the Court largely dodged the question of whether for-profit 
corporations have a First Amendment right to exercise religion, resting its opin-
ion instead on the statutory rights provided under the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act.6 In doing so, the decision left a jurisprudential gap that this article 
fills. 
I conclude that for-profit corporations do have the ability to exercise reli-
gion as understood under the First Amendment. A logical application of First 
Amendment precedent allows for no other result. But while corporations have 
the ability to exercise religion, most do not do so. Indeed, recognizing that for-
profit corporations can exercise religion begs the more difficult question of 
how we can know when such a corporation actually is practicing religion. The 
difficulties posed by this question require a standard to differentiate between 
genuine religious claims worthy of protection and sham claims presented only 
to win some secular benefit.  
Thus, I propose a practical framework—deeply rooted in existing First 
Amendment law—to determine which corporations exercise religion and which 
do not. I argue that courts considering corporate free exercise claims should 
evaluate the sincerity of the beliefs underlying that exercise, looking to the 
overt practices of the corporation as a corporation distinct from its shareholders 
for clear indications of religious practice. Where a corporation—for-profit or 
otherwise—has demonstrated a sincere commitment to a particular set of reli-
gious practices, it may fairly be said to be exercising religion and ought to fall 
under the aegis of the First Amendment’s religious protections. The test I pro-
pose will allow corporations the opportunity to vindicate their religious rights 
without throwing open the floodgates to all manner of inappropriate claims. 
The test threads a tricky legal needle and provides a workable basis for courts 
to decide corporate free exercise claims brought under the First Amendment. 
Rather than erecting artificial barriers that prevent worthy parties from assert-
ing their rights, I argue that, with appropriate judicial oversight, it is possible to 
recognize the free and full assertion of rights within our society. 
This article will proceed in five parts. In the first part, I explain the statuto-
ry background of the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision and the dramatic 
circuit split that brought the case to the Supreme Court. Part II then delves into 
the Court’s Hobby Lobby ruling, explaining the opinion’s salient points and 
                                                                                                                                 
Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Decision, BALT. SUN, June 30, 2014, http://articles.baltimore 
sun.com/2014-06-30/news/bs-ed-hobby-lobby-20140630_1_hobby-lobby-conestoga-wood-
specialties-corp-supreme-court (“In allowing for-profit companies to opt out of contraceptive 
mandate, Supreme Court has extended religion’s reach and diminished individual rights.”). 
6  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014). 
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highlighting those areas where the Court erred. In Part III, I argue that First 
Amendment precedent and policy require recognition of for-profit corpora-
tions’ free exercise rights. Part IV presents a practical framework, based on 
judging a corporation’s sincerity as evidenced through its overt actions, for de-
termining which corporations actually exercise religion and are thus entitled to 
constitutional protection for that exercise. In Part V, I address some of the 
questions and objections raised by my proposed framework and demonstrate 
that those objections are not strong enough to compel a different result. For-
profit corporations, when they have manifested a set of sincere religious beliefs 
through their corporate practices, ought to enjoy constitutional protection for 
their religious exercise. 
I. THE ROAD TO HOBBY LOBBY 
 The Court’s Hobby Lobby decision took place before the backdrop of two 
significant pieces of legislation and five dramatically conflicting circuit court 
decisions. This section will set out that backdrop’s key features as a means to 
highlight the points of controversy. 
A. Legislation 
1. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) 
 Congress passed Obamacare in 2010 amid great controversy.7 Describing 
the legislative and political fights surrounding the legislation—to say nothing 
of the multitude of provisions in the statute—is far beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle. The portion relevant for the purposes here relates to the so-called employ-
er mandate. 
 This provision of Obamacare requires employers to provide certain mini-
mum health coverage at no cost to their employees, including “additional pre-
ventative care and screenings” for women.8 Notably, the law does not define 
what preventative care and screening is required. Rather, it provides that the 
Health Resources and Services Administration will issue appropriate guide-
lines. Thus, in itself, the employer mandate did not engender any more contro-
versy than other aspects of the legislation. But the devil, as always, is in the de-
tails. 
 In adopting the guidelines, the Administration required that employee 
health plans “include FDA-approved contraceptive methods.”9 This covers a 
range of methods. In fact,  
                                                        
7  Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, with a 
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy 
/24health.html?_r=0 (“While Democrats exulted, Republicans, who describe the measure as 
an example of big government run amok, said it was no day to celebrate.”). 
8  42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(4) (2012). 
9  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1123 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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[t]he FDA has approved twenty such methods, ranging from oral contraceptives 
to surgical sterilization. Four of the twenty approved methods—two types of in-
trauterine devices (IUDs) and the emergency contraceptives commonly known 
as Plan B and Ella—can function by preventing the implantation of a fertilized 
egg. The remaining methods function by preventing fertilization.10 
Catholic employers objected, claiming that they were religiously opposed to 
any form of contraception.11 Additional objections arose from those who did 
not necessarily oppose all forms of contraception, but did object to the inclu-
sion of the four methods that allegedly prevent a fertilized egg from implanting 
in the uterus.12 
 In response to these concerns, particularly those raised by Catholic organi-
zations, the Administration allowed exemptions for “religious employers and 
health insurance coverage provided in connection with group health plans es-
tablished or maintained by religious employers with respect to any requirement 
to cover contraceptive services.”13 The regulations define a “religious employ-
er” as one that:  
(1) has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily employs 
persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its 
religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization described in a provision of 
the Internal Revenue Code that refers to churches, their integrated auxiliaries, 
conventions or associations of churches, and to the exclusively religious activi-
ties of any religious order.14 
The regulations also allow exemptions for certain non-profit organizations (in-
cluding religiously affiliated colleges), employers with “grandfathered” plans 
that make no changes to their policies after the effective date of the law, and 
employers with fewer than fifty employees.15 For these exempt organizations, 
the law provided a mechanism by which insurance providers would offer con-
traceptive coverage directly to employees without cost to either the employee 
or the employer.16 These exceptions, however, did not extend to for-profit cor-
porations, even where shareholders had religious objections to complying with 
the mandate. 
 Opponents of the mandate claimed that their constitutional free exercise 
rights were violated by the coercive penalty they would face for failing to abide 
                                                        
10  Id. While the science behind these claims regarding prevention of implantation of a ferti-
lized egg is disputed I include the language here as an indication of the point of controversy 
in Hobby Lobby. See Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
11  See Love and Sexuality, U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-
and-teachings/what-we-believe/love-and-sexuality/index.cfm (last visited Aug. 24, 2015); 
Press Release, U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops, HHS Final Rule Still Requires Action Con-
gress, By Courts, Says Cardinal Dolan, (July 3, 2013), http://www.usccb.org/news/2013/13-
137.cfm. 
12  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1124–25. 
13  45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(A) (2014). 
14  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1123 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B)). 
15  Id. at 1123–24. 
16  45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c) (2014). 
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by the law.17 Failure to comply with the employer mandate can result in steep 
fines. The law provides for a fine of $100 per day for each individual who 
should be receiving the mandated coverage.18 For large employers, the liability 
could be huge. According to the Tenth Circuit, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., with 
more than 13,000 employees, could be subject to almost $475 million in fines 
per year.19  
2.  The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
 The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 arose from congressional 
disapproval of the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith.20 In Smith, the Court abandoned the approach announced twenty-seven 
years previously in Sherbert v. Verner requiring that laws imposing a substan-
tial burden on an individual’s free exercise of religion pass strict scrutiny to 
survive constitutional review.21 The Court in Smith overruled the Sherbert 
standard in all but name. Contemplating the religious use of peyote, the Court 
held that religious freedom does not excuse an individual from the obligation to 
comply with “valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability” that only inci-
dentally infringe upon the exercise of religion.22 The Court reasoned that its 
past application of strict scrutiny under Sherbert was limited to circumstances 
that implicated a separate right or involved unemployment compensation.23 
Therefore, the test did not apply to all other government policies that did not 
intentionally target religion.24 
 In response to this judicial relaxation of scrutiny, Congress passed RFRA.25 
The law provides that: 
(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in sub-
section (b) of this section. 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
                                                        
17  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014). 
18  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1125 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) (2012)). 
19  Id. Ironically, the employer would only face fines of $26 million per year if it dropped 
health coverage for its employees altogether. Id. 
20  494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
21  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 251 (3d ed. 2010). 
22  Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990). 
23  Id. at 881, 883. 
24  See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–
32 (1993). 
25  FARBER, supra note 21, at 255. 
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(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental in-
terest.26 
In case there was any doubt as to the law’s intended goal, the Senate Report on 
the bill declared that the act was “intended to restore the compelling interest 
test previously applicable to free exercise cases by requiring that government 
actions that substantially burden the exercise of religion be demonstrated to be 
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.”27 
By passing RFRA, Congress statutorily restored the Sherbert strict scrutiny 
test.28  
In the 1997 case of City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck 
down RFRA as applied to the states because Congress had exceeded its authori-
ty to act under the Fourteenth Amendment.29 But “RFRA still constrains the 
federal government.”30 In response to City of Boerne, Congress passed the Re-
ligious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).31 Among other 
things, the law broadened RFRA’s definition of “the exercise of religion” from 
“the exercise of religion under the First Amendment” to “any exercise of reli-
gion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”32 
Because Obamacare is a federal law, the employer mandate fell within the 
strictures of RFRA. If the mandate substantially burdened a person’s exercise 
of religion, it would be struck down unless the government could establish that 
the mandate is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling govern-
ment interest.33 Thus, given the challenges of meeting the strict scrutiny stand-
ard, the government had a strong strategic incentive to argue that the Obamac-
are mandates did not burden a person’s religious exercise. Determining who (or 
what) counts as a person proved to be a more difficult question. 
                                                        
26  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
27  S. REPORT NO. 103-111, at 8 (1993). 
28  FARBER, supra note 21, at 255. The veracity of this statement is a point of contention be-
tween the Hobby Lobby majority and dissent. The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby asserts 
that RFRA went beyond the Sherbert test by adding a “least restrictive” requirement that was 
absent from the earlier jurisprudence. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2761 n.3 (2014) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 509 (1997)). In contrast, Jus-
tice Ginsburg’s dissent contended that the least restrictive means requirement was a feature 
of the Sherbert test. Id. at 2793. Definitively resolving this dispute is ultimately beyond the 
scope of this article as I focus primarily on corporations’ rights under the First Amendment 
and not RFRA. 
29  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997); FARBER, supra note 21, at 255. 
30  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal cita-
tions omitted). 
31  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2761. 
32  Id. at 2761–62 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2(4) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-5(7)(A) (2012)). 
33  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
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B. Circuit Court Decisions 
 During oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Justice Sotomayor told 
Hobby Lobby’s attorney, Paul Clement, that he had “picked great plaintiffs” for 
asserting corporate free exercise rights.34 To understand that statement and the 
case’s path to the Supreme Court, this section will briefly highlight the factual 
and procedural history of the cases underlying the circuit split on this issue. 
1. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius 
The first of the two consolidated cases heard before the Supreme Court was 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, decided in the Tenth Circuit.35 There, 
Hobby Lobby, Inc. and Mardel, a related corporation, brought a suit challeng-
ing Obamacare under RFRA and the free exercise clause of the First Amend-
ment. The Tenth Circuit briefly described the plaintiffs: 
David Green is the founder of Hobby Lobby, an arts and crafts chain with over 
500 stores and about 13,000 full-time employees. Hobby Lobby is a closely held 
family business organized as an S-corp. Steve Green is president of Hobby Lob-
by, and his siblings occupy various positions on the Hobby Lobby board. Mart 
Green is the founder and CEO of Mardel, an affiliated chain of thirty-five Chris-
tian bookstores with just under 400 employees, also run on a for-profit basis.36 
The Greens claimed to “have organized their businesses with express religious 
principles in mind.”37 For instance, the Hobby Lobby statement of purpose in-
cludes honoring God and “operating the company in a manner consistent with 
Biblical principles,” the Greens closed their stores on Sundays, the owners re-
fused to engage in activities that promote alcohol use, and both companies were 
governed by a management trust that required commitment to religious princi-
ples.38 Over the holidays each year, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. “placed, paid for, 
and signed” ads encouraging readers to “believe in the love that sent Jesus 
Christ. Accept the hope. Accept the joy. Accept the LIFE!”39 In addition, Hob-
by Lobby paid for spiritual counseling and religiously oriented financial cours-
es for its employees.40 
While the Greens did not object to providing insurance that included con-
traceptive care in general, they raised religious objections to providing contra-
ceptives that prevent uterine implantation of a fertilized egg.41 While there was 
                                                        
34  Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (No. 13-354). 
35  See generally, 723 F.3d 1114. 
36  Id. at 1122. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Mark L. Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, 21 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 79 (2013). 
40  Id. at 78. 
41  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1125. 
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no dispute as to the sincerity of the Greens’ beliefs,42 the question was whether 
those beliefs could fairly be imputed to the corporations the Greens headed, 
given that those corporations are distinct legal entities from their owners.  
Over a vigorous dissent, the Tenth Circuit held that Hobby Lobby, Inc. 
could assert a religious free exercise claim under RFRA.43 The court reasoned 
that RFRA’s language protects corporations just as it protects individuals,44 and 
that profit-seeking is not a ground to deny religious rights.45  
2. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation v. Secretary of U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 
 In the second of the consolidated cases the Supreme Court considered, 
Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation v. Secretary of U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, the Third Circuit considered facts essentially iden-
tical to the Hobby Lobby case. There, the Hahn family owned “100 percent of 
the voting shares of Conestoga.”46 Like the Greens in Hobby Lobby, the Hahns 
operated “Conestoga in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral prin-
ciples.”47 In this case, that meant following the precepts of the Mennonite reli-
gion. “According to [the Hahns’] Amended Complaint, the Mennonite Church 
‘teaches that taking of life which includes anything that terminates a fertilized 
embryo is intrinsic evil and a sin against God to which they are held accounta-
ble.’ ”48 Thus, like the Greens, the Hahns objected to the requirement that they 
provide health coverage to Conestoga employees that included contraceptive 
methods to prevent the uterine implantation of a fertilized egg.49 
 The Third Circuit, over another strong dissent, reached a very different re-
sult than the Tenth Circuit had in Hobby Lobby. Without reaching the question 
of whether corporations counted as people under RFRA, the Third Circuit held 
that corporations lack the ability to exercise religion and so cannot bring suit 
alleging a violation of that right.50 According to the court, for-profit corpora-
tions are barred from claiming protected religious freedoms because the “na-
ture, history, and purpose” of the First Amendment did not support deeming 
free exercise to be anything other than a purely personal right.51 The court fur-
ther based its reasoning on the “total absence of caselaw” in which “a for-profit 
                                                        
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 1121. 
44  Id. at 1129. 
45  Id. at 1135. 
46  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 
F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013). 
47  Id. at 390 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
48  Id. at 381–82 (citation omitted). 
49  Id. 
50  Id. at 388. 
51  Id. at 385 (quoting First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978)). 
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secular corporation was itself found to have free exercise rights.”52 Thus, in the 
Third Circuit, the Obamacare challenge failed. 
*** 
 Given the depth of the circuit split on the issue and the importance of the 
issues involved, it was, perhaps, inevitable that the Supreme Court would hear 
the case.53 On November 26, 2013, the Court announced that it would once 
more delve into the legal challenges to Obamacare by granting certiorari to the 
Hobby Lobby and Conestoga cases as a consolidated appeal.54  
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC. 
 The first thing to understand about the Hobby Lobby decision is that it was 
not a First Amendment decision. Rather, the Court decided the case entirely on 
statutory grounds under RFRA and declined to reach the underlying constitu-
tional issues.55 Nevertheless, the Court’s analysis does help shed light on the 
constitutional matters discussed in this article. 
 Justice Alito, writing for a five-member majority, held that Obamacare’s 
“contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates 
RFRA.”56 As will be discussed below, it is unclear if the holding is actually 
limited to closely held corporations, but so the Court claimed. Justice Kennedy 
issued a brief concurrence and Justice Ginsburg wrote a “respectful and power-
ful dissent.”57 
Although the decision facially appears to offer the now-familiar liber-
al/conservative split, there was another distinction that is of particular im-
portance for the discussion in this article. While Justices Breyer and Kagan 
joined the bulk of the Ginsburg dissent, they wrote a brief separate opinion in-
dicating that they “need not and do not decide whether either for-profit corpora-
tions or their owners may bring claims under the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993.”58 
                                                        
52  Id. at 384–85. 
53  In addition to the two cases considered by the Supreme Court, three other circuits decided 
similar claims. See Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2013) (ruling 
against corporation); Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1218 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (allowing suit to be brought by corporate shareholders);.Korte v. Sebelius, 
No. 12-3841, 2012 WL 6757353, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 2012). 
54  Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Contraception Cases Challenging Health Law, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, at A13. 
55  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014). 
56  Id. 
57  Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
58  Id. at 2806 (Breyer, J. and Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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A. Arguments from RFRA 
 To fully understand the Court’s analysis, it is worth examining the RFRA-
specific arguments on which the Court ruled. First, in interpreting RFRA’s 
statutory language, the Court looked to the Dictionary Act—a kind of meta-
statute that provides default definitions for terms used elsewhere in the United 
States Code. This analysis provided the majority with a “quick, clear, and af-
firmative answer to the question whether the companies involved in these cases 
may be heard.”59 The Dictionary Act’s definition of “person” plainly includes 
corporations like those bringing challenge here: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates 
otherwise . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . the words “person” and “whoever” include corporations, companies, 
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as 
well as individuals60 
Justice Alito wrote that he saw “nothing in RFRA that suggests a congressional 
intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition.”61 Moreover, he noted that 
the government conceded that non-profit corporations can claim RFRA person-
hood and that the Court had previously heard RFRA and free-exercise claims 
raised by non-profit corporations.62 This essentially decided the matter because, 
in Justice Alito’s view, “no conceivable definition of the term [‘person’] in-
cludes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corpora-
tions.”63 
 Moreover, Justice Alito read RFRA, as amended by RLUIPA, as providing 
broad protection for rights, extending even beyond what the First Amendment 
would cover. He read the RLUIPA amendment as “an obvious effort to effect a 
complete separation from First Amendment case law.”64 Justice Alito found ev-
idence of this desire for complete separation in the fact that “Congress deleted 
the reference to the First Amendment and defined the ‘exercise of religion’ to 
include ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief.’ ”65 Thus, the exercise of religion protected under 
RFRA was completely divorced from what the First Amendment did or did not 
protect. According to Justice Alito, the First Amendment’s precedents are not 
necessarily prologue for interpreting RFRA rights.  
                                                        
59  Id. at 2768. 
60  1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
61  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
62  Id. at 2768–69 (citing Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 
U.S. 418 (2006); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). 
63  Id. at 2769. 
64  Id. at 2761–62. 
65  Id. at 2762 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(7)(A) (2012)). 
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B. Arguments from Precedent 
 After arguing that RLUIPA created a complete separation between RFRA 
interpretation and pre-Smith First Amendment precedent, the majority nonethe-
less argued that recognizing corporate free exercise rights was consistent with 
its earlier decisions regarding religious rights under the First Amendment. The 
majority cited a series of free exercise cases brought by religious and non-profit 
incorporated parties under the First Amendment and RFRA, in which the Court 
expressed no hesitation about entertaining the claims.66 These precedents 
strongly indicated that the mere fact of incorporation did not warrant disregard-
ing the parties’ free exercise rights. While none of those cases explicitly ad-
dressed the parties’ incorporated status, each case also assumed that it posed no 
significant hurdle.  
 The non-profit nature of the corporations in those precedent cases was not 
dispositive, however, because another line of cases indicated that individuals 
could exercise their religion while seeking profits. In particular, the majority 
looked to Braunfield v. Brown, where the Court “entertained the free-exercise 
claims of individuals who were attempting to make a profit as retail merchants, 
and the Court never even hinted that this objective precluded their claims.”67 
This holding reflected the understanding that religious beliefs can compel ac-
tion across a wide range of contexts, including “[b]usiness practices that are 
compelled or limited by the tenets of a religious doctrine.”68 Given the breadth 
of religious practice protected under the First Amendment, the majority rea-
soned, free exercise rights must extend to incorporated as well as unincorpo-
rated businesses.  
 Moreover, the majority highlighted one case in which the Court seemed to 
accept that a for-profit corporation had standing to assert a free exercise claim. 
In Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket, the Court heard a challenge to a 
Massachusetts Sunday closing law brought “by a kosher market that was orga-
nized as a for-profit corporation, by customers of the market, and by a rabbi. 
[Massachusetts] argued that the corporation lacked ‘standing’ to assert a free-
exercise claim, but not one member of the Court expressed agreement with that 
argument.”69 Although not explicitly discussed by the Gallagher Court at the 
time, the Hobby Lobby majority interpreted this tacit acceptance as indication 
that for-profit corporations were not necessarily barred from raising free exer-
cise claims.70 
                                                        
66  Id. at 2768–69 (citing Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 418; Hosanna–Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 694; 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 520). 
67  Id. at 2769–70 (citing Braunfeld v. Braun, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). 
68  Id. at 2770. 
69  Id. at 2772 (citing Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 
(1961)). 
70  Id. (writing that Gallagher “suggests, if anything, that for-profit corporations possess such 
rights”). 
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 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent vigorously contested each of these precedential 
arguments, writing that the majority’s position “surely is not grounded in the 
pre-Smith precedent Congress sought to preserve” when it passed RFRA.71 She 
once again highlighted the unique nature of the issues raised in the case: 
Until this litigation, no decision of this Court recognized a for-profit corpora-
tion’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally applicable law, 
whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA. The absence of such prece-
dent is just what one would expect, for the exercise of religion is characteristic 
of natural persons, not artificial legal entities.72 
Nor did Justice Ginsburg find the majority’s analogies to past cases particularly 
compelling. While the majority largely elided the distinction between non-
profit and for-profit organizations, Ginsburg found that difference crucial. 
While communal activity was central to religious practice, the Court had only 
previously protected organizations that were explicitly religious.73 Such organi-
zations were due “special solicitude,” but that solicitude did not traditionally 
extend to commercial organizations.74 “Indeed, until [the Hobby Lobby deci-
sion], religious exemptions had never been extended to any entity operating in 
the commercial, profit-making world.”75 Ginsburg further dismissed the Gal-
lagher case as an inapposite comparison. In her view, the fact that four of the 
five “challengers were human individuals, not artificial, law-created entities,” 
meant that it was not necessary to determine whether the corporation could 
bring the suit.76 Thus, the Court’s silence on the matter should be read not as 
acceptance of a for-profit corporation’s free exercise rights so much as the 
Court declining to reach an irrelevant issue. In sum, Justice Ginsburg viewed 
the Hobby Lobby majority’s position as unsound both as a matter of First 
Amendment and of statutory law. 
C. Arguments from Policy 
 The majority further argued that it was important to protect the religious 
rights of corporations because those protections actually benefit the individuals 
behind the corporation.77 After all, “[a] corporation is simply a form of organi-
zation used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”78 Just as extending the 
takings clause to corporations protects the individuals who have a financial 
stake in the corporation, “protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations . . . 
protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those compa-
                                                        
71  Id. at 2796. 
72  Id. at 2794. 
73  Id. at 2794–95. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 2795 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
76  Id. at 2794 n.13. 
77  Id. at 2768. 
78  Id. 
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nies.”79 This argument is relatively uncontroversial, at least as applied to non-
profit religious entities.80 But Justice Ginsburg would draw the line there, writ-
ing that there is a clear “distinction between a community made up of believers 
in the same religion and one embracing persons of diverse beliefs.”81 Clear 
though this distinction might be, it does not necessarily bear the weight that 
Ginsburg places on it. The principle of individual rights through corporate pro-
tections can apply equally to for-profit corporations.82 This is why it is uncon-
troversial to protect corporate property rights as a means of protecting individ-
ual interests. Where a corporation, for-profit or otherwise, exists to further the 
religious beliefs of its shareholders, it seems reasonable to assume that protect-
ing the corporation’s free exercise rights will benefit the individuals behind the 
corporation. Nor does this seem unjust. 
 Moreover, corporations, as creations of state law, can exist for a broad 
range of purposes. Under the laws of Pennsylvania and Oklahoma (the plaintiff 
corporations’ states of incorporation), for-profit corporations can be formed “to 
pursue ‘any lawful purpose’ or ‘act.’ ”83 This language would appear broad 
enough to include “the pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners’ reli-
gious principles.”84 There seems little basis to interpret the free exercise clause 
so narrowly as to exclude this practice. As Justice Kennedy wrote in concur-
rence, free exercise means “the right to express [religious] beliefs and to estab-
lish one’s religious (or nonreligious) self-definition in the political, civic, and 
economic life of our larger community.”85 Thus, certain shareholders—like the 
Hobby Lobby plaintiffs—may “deem it necessary to exercise their religious be-
liefs within the context of their own closely held, for-profit corporations.”86 
The most obvious objection to this position—that it may lead to internecine re-
ligious conflict within a corporation—is easily addressed by reference to state 
law governing how corporations are to be run.87 Just as state law articulates 
how other aspects of corporate identity—name, election of directors, business 
decisions—are to be determined, it can be used for disputes over religious iden-
tity and affiliation. 
D. Problematic Aspects 
 While reaching essentially the right result on the standing issue, the majori-
ty’s decision in Hobby Lobby contained several problematic aspects, particular-
ly as similar cases work their way through the courts in the future. Perhaps 
                                                        
79  Id. 
80  See id. at 2794. 
81  Id. at 2796. 
82  Id. at 2769 (majority opinion). 
83  Id. at 2771 (citations omitted). 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
86  Id. 
87  Id. at 2774–75 (majority opinion). 
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most notable of those aspects is that the Court based its decision entirely on 
statutory grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional question.88 
While this is a typical application of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, it 
leaves a serious question as to the constitutional protections afforded for-profit 
corporations that wish to exercise religious rights. This question is cast into 
sharper relief by the majority’s insistence that RFRA’s definition of “religion” 
is completely independent of the First Amendment’s conception of the term.89 
Hobby Lobby decides the issue where the challenge is against a federal law, but 
it does not suggest a path for courts considering challenges to state laws where 
RFRA does not apply.90 Now that Hobby Lobby has been decided in favor of 
corporate rights, it seems just a matter of time before similar suits are brought 
challenging state laws.91 The Supreme Court’s ruling here will be of only lim-
ited help in guiding those state court decisions.  
 A second weakness in the Court’s ruling is the majority’s shifting language 
on just how broadly its opinion should reach. As Justice Ginsburg noted: “Al-
though the Court attempts to cabin its language to closely held corporations, its 
logic extends to corporations of any size, public or private.”92 Indeed, the scope 
the majority seems to have had in mind appears to shift from sentence to sen-
tence. Justice Alito wrote that the government’s concession that non-profit cor-
porations could assert free exercise rights “effectively dispatches any argument 
that the term ‘person’ as used in RFRA does not reach the closely held corpora-
tions involved in these cases. No known understanding of the term ‘person’ in-
cludes some but not all corporations.”93 The first sentence appears to focus on 
the rights of closely held corporations, like the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby. But 
immediately following that assertion, the Court expands its reasoning to en-
compass all corporations. The majority seems to intend to eliminate the distinc-
tion between non-profit and for-profit corporations, but the language just as 
easily erases the lines between closely held and publicly traded corporations. A 
massive corporation like Apple fits just as easily within this language as the 
family-owned Hobby Lobby. This is not to say that the Court is incorrect in de-
clining to draw such a distinction. As this article will argue, all corporations, 
                                                        
88  Id. at 2785. 
89  Id. at 2761–62. 
90  See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see also FARBER, supra note 
21, at 255. 
91  Given the host of recent lawsuits brought challenging state laws regarding contraceptive 
availability and requiring wedding businesses to accommodate gay weddings, the likelihood 
is that the issue will arise sooner rather than later. See, e.g., Nigel Duara, Appeals Courts 
Hears Emergency Contraceptives Case, HERALDNET (Nov. 20, 2014, 4:39 PM), 
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20141120/NEWS03/141129855/Appeals-court-hears-
emergency-contraceptives-case; Michael Paulson, Can’t Have Your Cake, Gays Are Told, 
and a Rights Battle Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2014, at A1. The frequency of litigation on 
this matter is accelerating now that the Supreme Court has ruled that there is a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). 
92  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
93  Id. at 2769. 
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regardless of size, have the right to exercise religion. But the Court here ap-
pears to have either been unaware of the breadth of its ruling or intended to ob-
scure that breadth. In either event, it is not an ideal means of resolving serious 
issues. 
 In another point of analytical imprecision, the Court regularly conflated the 
corporate shareholders with the corporation itself. Throughout the opinion, the 
majority referred to the religious beliefs of the shareholders as the defining in-
quiry.94 The Court also acknowledged, however, that it was the corporate enti-
ty—which under the law is legally separate from its shareholders—that bore 
the burden of the health care law.95 The Court then conflated these two facts 
and found that the corporation’s sincere religious beliefs were violated, com-
pletely ignoring the legal separation between a corporation and its sharehold-
ers.96 This separation is one of the primary incentives to incorporate, because it 
protects individuals from personal liability for corporate debts. As Justice 
Ginsburg highlighted: “One might ask why the separation should hold only 
when it serves the interest of those who control the corporation.”97 The majori-
ty offers no answer to this question, instead presenting its conflated view of 
shareholder beliefs and corporate obligations as if there were no separation. 
 These flaws—the lack of constitutional guidance, the broader-than-
indicated reach of the opinion, and the conflation of shareholders and corpora-
tions—present potential problems when considering the possibility of larger 
corporations with more ambiguous religious beliefs challenging a state law on 
free exercise grounds. After all, the plaintiffs in this case were well-chosen to 
highlight a certain set of issues.98 But what happens when plaintiffs who are not 
so great bring suit? The majority’s opinion “does not even begin to explain how 
one might go about ascertaining the religious scruples of a corporation where 
shares are sold to the public.”99 What happens when a corporation’s religious 
practices are not as clear as in Hobby Lobby or where the corporate sharehold-
ers share diverse—even conflicting—religious beliefs?  
By failing to address many of these problems because they did not present 
themselves in the instant case, the majority’s opinion provides little to no guid-
ance for how these issues should be resolved. Instead, the majority simply 
wrote that it was unlikely that large publicly traded corporations would bring 
free exercise claims and highlighted that no such corporations had yet brought 
                                                        
94  Id. at 2775 (“As we have noted, the Hahns and Greens have a sincere religious belief that 
life begins at conception.”). 
95  Id. at 2775–76 (“If the companies continue to offer group health plans that do not cover 
the contraceptives at issue, they will be taxed $100 per day for each affected individual.”). 
96  See id. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“By incorporating a business, however, an indi-
vidual separates herself from the entity and escapes personal responsibility for the entity’s 
obligations.”). 
97  Id. 
98  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 
2751 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
99  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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suit asserting religious rights.100 While true enough, this is a remarkably blink-
ered view. After all, before the present crop of cases challenging Obamacare, 
the issue of corporate free exercise rights had never been directly addressed by 
the Supreme Court or any other court.101 But according to the Becket Fund for 
Religious Liberty, within two months of the Hobby Lobby decision, there were 
102 pending cases opposing the contraception mandate.102 Of those cases, 49 
were filed on behalf of for-profit businesses.103 Each of those cases was neces-
sarily brought since Obamacare passed in 2010. This veritable explosion of 
claims made a previously unprecedented issue a relatively frequent cause of ac-
tion in a mere four-year period. In light of this explosion, it is unpersuasive to 
say that the issue is unlikely to arise simply because it has not come up yet. 
Moreover, because the corporate plaintiffs won in Hobby Lobby, it seems likely 
that more frequent and more ambiguous claims will arise challenging a host of 
state and federal laws. The holes, conflations, and elisions in the majority’s rea-
soning will be cast into even sharper relief as this new set of cases begins to be 
heard. 
 The remainder of this article attempts to address those analytical shortcom-
ings head-on to provide a principled and practical approach to corporate free 
exercise claims under the First Amendment. In doing so, it will provide a path 
for future courts to follow as they hear and decide questions of the constitution-
al free exercise rights of for-profit corporations. 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT CASE FOR CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS 
 This section will set out the case for granting free exercise rights to for-
profit corporations under the First Amendment. A careful analysis of legal 
precedents and the policies that underlie them reveals that granting such rights 
is a logical and necessary extension of the current First Amendment doctrine. 
Far from being a radical corporate power grab, the recognition of corporate free 
exercise rights is a rational step based on existing law and lived experience.  
                                                        
100  Id. at 2774. 
101  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., in 
chambers) (“This Court has not previously addressed similar RFRA or free exercise claims 
brought by closely held for-profit corporations and their controlling shareholders alleging 
that the mandatory provision of certain employee benefits substantially burdens their exer-
cise of religion.”). 
102  HHS Mandate Information Central, THE BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, (Aug. 
16, 2014), http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/. 
103  Id. 
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A. Corporations Enjoy First Amendment Rights 
 There is no question that corporations enjoy certain constitutional rights, 
though it may be difficult to determine exactly which rights those are.104 As a 
result, debates over corporate constitutional rights tend to become passionate. 
The commentary leading up to and immediately following the Hobby Lobby 
decision provides a clear case in point.105 
Despite these debates, since the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, American courts have recognized that cor-
porations have at least some First Amendment rights.106 In Bellotti, the Court 
addressed a Massachusetts statute criminalizing “expenditures by banks and 
business corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum 
proposals” where the referendum was not related to “issues that materially af-
fect [the corporation’s] business, property, or assets.”107 The Court rejected the 
notion that states can statutorily limit corporate speech on matters that do not 
“materially affect” the corporation.108 As the Court held, “Freedom of speech 
and the other freedoms encompassed by the First Amendment always have 
been viewed as fundamental components of the liberty safeguarded by the Due 
Process Clause, and the Court has not identified a separate source for the right 
when it has been asserted by corporations.”109 The Court controversially revis-
ited this holding in its 2010 Citizens United decision, where it wrote that “[t]he 
Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or 
other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment 
simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’ ”110 
 In Bellotti, the Court focused on the nature of the right to be protected, not 
the identity of the party exercising the right. “The proper question therefore is 
not whether corporations ‘have’ First Amendment rights and, if so, whether 
they are coextensive with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must 
be whether [the statute] abridges expression that the First Amendment was 
meant to protect.”111 Thus, provided that the right in question falls within the 
zone of constitutional protection, the Constitution will protect the exercise of 
the right regardless of the speaker’s identity—be it a natural person or a corpo-
ration. 
                                                        
104  Katherine Lepard, Comment, Standing Their Ground: Corporations’ Fight for Religious 
Rights in Light of the Enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Contra-
ceptive Coverage Mandate, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1041, 1048 (2013). 
105  See supra note 5. 
106  See generally First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
107  Id. at 767. 
108  Id. at 767–68, 781. 
109  Id. at 780 (citations omitted). 
110  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (citations omitted). 
111  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776. 
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 This does not mean, however, that all rights afforded natural persons are 
automatically extended to corporations as well. This results in a puzzling and 
apparently inconsistent legal thicket: 
Today, corporations possess some First Amendment free speech and press 
rights, some rights of expressive association, and (perhaps) some right to free 
exercise. They enjoy Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches 
but only a limited right to privacy. Corporations possess Fifth Amendment rights 
against double jeopardy and takings but no rights against self-incrimination. The 
Sixth Amendment guarantees corporations a right to trial by jury and to counsel 
but not a right to appointed counsel. Corporations are “citizens” for purposes of 
Article III jurisdictional powers but not “citizens” for purposes of the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause. Corporations are “persons” with Fourteenth Amendment 
rights to equal protection and procedural due process and some, but not all, of 
the incorporated Bill of Rights. Corporations are also “persons” who may spend 
money to influence voters, but they cannot themselves become voters under the 
Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, or Twenty-Fourth Amendments.112 
As one scholar described it, “[s]orting the Amendments into the boxes ‘availa-
ble to corporations’ and ‘not available to corporations’ appears to require some 
consideration of each Amendment’s purposes. Of course, identifying those 
purposes is itself complex.”113 The clearest guidance the Supreme Court has 
given on the matter directs courts to consider whether the right in question is 
personal in nature. “Certain ‘purely personal’ guarantees, such as the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and oth-
er organizations because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has 
been limited to the protection of individuals.”114 The inquiry to determine 
whether a particular right applies to corporations “depends on the nature, histo-
ry, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”115 
In Bellotti, the Court had no difficulty rejecting the conclusion that “speech 
that otherwise would be within the protection of the First Amendment loses that 
protection simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to the 
satisfaction of a court, a material effect on its business or property.”116 Thus, 
political speech is not a purely personal right. But the Court’s decision did not 
go any further in providing guidance as to whether other First Amendment pro-
tections were likewise applicable to corporations as well as natural persons. At 
a minimum, however, there is no per se legal bar to for-profit corporations ex-
ercising First Amendment rights. The question then becomes whether the free 
                                                        
112  Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate 
Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887, 910–11 (2011) (footnotes omitted). 
113  Mark Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 70, 72 (2013). 
114  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698–701 
(1944)). 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at 784. 
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exercise clause of the First Amendment is a purely personal right that is inac-
cessible to corporations. 
B. Religion Is Not a Purely Personal Right 
 In its description of “purely personal” rights, the Bellotti Court cited its 
1944 decision in United States v. White.117 There, the Court held that the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments could not be asserted on behalf of a labor union because 
those rights were personal and could not be exercised by a corporate entity:  
This conclusion is not reached by any mechanical comparison of unions with 
corporations or with other entities nor by any determination of whether unions 
technically may be regarded as legal personalities for any or all purposes. The 
test, rather, is whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a par-
ticular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its 
membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the pure-
ly private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their 
common or group interests only. If so, the privilege cannot be invoked on behalf 
of the organization or its representatives in their official capacity.118 
Interestingly, this test seems to create friction with the Court’s opinion in Bel-
lotti that the focus should not be on the identity of the party exercising the right, 
but on the nature of the right itself.119 Perhaps this is best squared by conceptu-
alizing the inquiry as whether the particular organization is composed in such a 
way that makes the exercise of a particular right plausible. 
 Some courts and commentators contend that the exercise of religion fails 
this test. The Third Circuit held, “We do not see how a for-profit artificial be-
ing, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law, that was 
created to make money could exercise such an inherently ‘human’ right.”120 
The court wrote that even if it “were to disregard the lack of historical recogni-
tion of the right, [the court] simply cannot understand how a for-profit, secular 
corporation—apart from its owners—can exercise religion.”121 In this view, 
corporations are categorically incapable of exercising religion and thus barred 
from asserting religious rights under the First Amendment. 
These critics also point to several instances where the Court has seemed to 
indicate that the exercise of religion is a right reserved for individuals. For in-
stance, in Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court wrote, “[a]s is plain from its text, the 
First Amendment was adopted to curtail the power of congress to interfere with 
the individual’s freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in ac-
                                                        
117  See generally United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944). 
118  Id. at 701. 
119  See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
120  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
121  Id. 
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cordance with the dictates of his own conscience.”122 Similarly, in School Dis-
trict of Abington Township v. Schempp, the Court wrote, “[t]he Free Exercise 
Clause . . . withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of 
any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious 
liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authori-
ty.”123 This language, although never essential to the holdings of the cases, is 
supposed to reflect the understanding that “[r]eligious belief takes shape within 
the minds and hearts of individuals, and its protection is one of the more 
uniquely ‘human’ rights provided by the Constitution.”124  
 Despite the common sense appeal of declaring religion something that only 
individuals can believe and practice, there is a wide range of precedent to the 
contrary. First, “[i]t is beyond question that associations—not just individu-
als—have Free Exercise rights . . . .”125 Any assertion to the contrary “is plainly 
wrong, as numerous Supreme Court decisions have recognized the right of cor-
porations to enjoy the free exercise of religion.”126 “It is also a brute social fact 
that people practice religion collectively. To protect religion only within the 
confines of personal conscience or individual action would do great violence to 
lived religion.”127 Thus, the Supreme Court’s “jurisprudence reflects the foun-
dational principle that religious bodies—representing a communion of faith and 
a community of believers—are entitled to the shield of the Free Exercise 
Clause.”128 To name just one instance, in the case Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, an incorporated church brought suit challenging 
legislative attempts to limit the practice of Santeria in the city.129 The fact that 
                                                        
122  Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (affirming injunction against prayer services 
in public schools) (emphasis added). 
123  Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1963) (holding that 
mandatory bible readings to start the public school day violated the First Amendment) (em-
phasis added). 
124  Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 408 (E.D. Pa. 
2013). 
125  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013); see also 
Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1306 
(11th Cir. 2006) (“easily” concluding that incorporated religious organization had standing 
to assert free exercise rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
126  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 398 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting); see also Ronald J. Colombo, The 
Naked Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013) (“Incorporated entities that are reli-
giously affiliated, such as churches and church-run non-profit organizations, unquestionably 
enjoy the protections of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.”). 
127  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 299. 
128  Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 378, 381 (1990); 
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter–Day Saints v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327, 330 (1987); Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 
292 (1985); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 
U.S. 94, 107–08 (1952)). 
129  508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
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the petitioner in the case was clearly an incorporated entity seeking vindication 
of its religious rights—as indicated in the very caption of the case—did not 
give the Court any apparent pause. Religious rights are not reserved solely for 
individuals.130 
 This recognition of broader free exercise rights comports with the notion of 
religion as a communal experience. In the words of the D.C. Circuit: “Because 
the word religion connotes a community of believers, the prohibition against 
the impingement on religious free exercise must be understood to cover the ac-
tivities of both individuals and religious bodies.”131 The Supreme Court’s juris-
prudence on the issue reflects that understanding:  
[T]he Court has recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in 
those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition 
for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion. The Constitution 
guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of pre-
serving other individual liberties.132 
Recognizing religion as a communally expressed right is consistent with tradi-
tion and Court jurisprudence. Given this, “there is nothing about the ‘nature, 
history, and purpose’ of religious exercise that limits it to individuals. Quite the 
opposite; believers have from time immemorial sought strength in numbers.”133 
The reality of religious practice in America is that it is often a communal activi-
ty.134 
 Even so, critics contend that the communal nature of religious practice 
does not necessarily mean that corporations are entitled to religious protections. 
“Courts have afforded free exercise rights to religious organizations and associ-
ations because they are a way in which individuals exercise their religion. In 
doing so, however, the Supreme Court has limited this extension to religious 
organizations and associations and has retained the personal aspect of exercis-
ing religion.”135 Under this view, the religious rights of incorporated churches 
were extended to the corporations “as churches, not (necessarily) as corpora-
tions.”136 If this is true, the corporate nature of some churches was immaterial 
and all that mattered was that a church asserted a religious claim. But even if 
we assume that churches do get special solicitude under the First Amendment, 
                                                        
130  Scott W. Gaylord, For-Profit Corporations, Free Exercise, and the HHS Mandate, 91 
WASH. U.L. REV. 589, 653 (2014) (“But if the exercise of religion is a ‘purely personal’ right 
as the district courts contend, then how can religious non-profits but not for-profit corpora-
tions exercise religion?”). 
131  Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132  Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (emphasis added). 
133  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377, 400 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
134  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 299. 
135  Zachary J. Phillipps, Note, Non-Prophets: Why For-Profit, Secular Corporations Cannot 
Exercise Religion Within the Meaning of the First Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. ONLINE 39, 
63–64 (2014). 
136  Tushnet, supra note 113, at 76. 
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it does not necessarily follow that for-profit corporations enjoy no rights at 
all.137 After all, while political speech is often deemed to be the core of the First 
Amendment’s speech clause,138 the clause extends to cover much more than 
that narrow category of utterances.139 
Moreover, reasoning based on corporate identity runs counter to Belotti’s 
instruction that courts should focus on the particular right being asserted—be it 
speech or religious activity—and not on the identity of the party asserting the 
right.140 After all, “if non-natural persons (religious non-profit corporations) 
can exercise religion, Bellotti’s reasoning instructs that for-profit corporations 
can also exercise religion.”141 Once it is acknowledged that religion is practiced 
collectively, there can be no going back and claiming that it remains a purely 
personal right when a for-profit corporation asserts a claim. And once a right is 
found to fall outside those purely personal rights, the focus appropriately turns 
to “whether [a statute] abridges [rights] that the First Amendment was meant to 
protect.”142 Because religion cannot properly be construed as a “purely person-
al” right, religious practice satisfies the Bellotti test and thus can be exercised 
by corporations as well as by individuals. 
C. Individuals Can Practice Religion in a For-Profit Context 
 Further extending the scope of protected religious practice, the Supreme 
Court has recognized the right of individuals to exercise religion in a for-profit 
context.143 The Court’s “free exercise jurisprudence seem[s] to preclude the ar-
gument that profit-making barred a party from making a free exercise claim.”144 
Thus, the mere intention to make a profit is not enough to defeat a free exercise 
claim.145  
For instance, in United States v. Lee, the Court accepted the right of an 
Amish employer to assert that paying Social Security taxes burdened his reli-
gious beliefs.146 The Court accepted the employer’s contention that compulsory 
                                                        
137  Gaylord, supra note 130, at 610; Tushnet, supra note 113, at 76. 
138  See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV. 297, 334 
(1995). 
139  See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down, on 
First Amendment grounds, law that criminalized “virtual” child pornography made without 
using actual children). 
140  Gaylord, supra note 130, at 626. 
141  Id. at 627–28. 
142  First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). 
143  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1134 (10th Cir. 2013) (“In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court has settled that individuals have Free Exercise rights with respect to 
their for-profit businesses.”) (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Braunfeld v. 
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)). 
144  Alan E. Garfield, The Contraception Mandate Debate: Achieving A Sensible Balance, 
114 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 9 (2014). 
145  Gaylord, supra note 130, at 623. 
146  See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
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participation in the Social Security program burdened his free exercise 
rights.147 But the Court ultimately held that there was no First Amendment vio-
lation because the intrusion on religious practice was minimal and justified by 
the government interests involved.148 Despite ruling for the government on the 
merits, the Court’s underlying assumption allowed for the individual employer 
to assert a claim based on his religious objections exercised in a for-profit con-
text. The Court made a similar assumption in Braunfeld v. Brown.149 There, the 
Court entertained a suit by an Orthodox Jewish business owner challenging a 
mandatory Sunday closing law on the grounds that his religion required he 
close on Saturday.150 Although the Court, as in Lee, ruled against the plaintiff, 
that ruling did not undermine the essential right of the individual to practice his 
religion in a for-profit context. Indeed, a “for-profit/non-profit distinction is . . . 
absent from the [Free Exercise] Clause’s history.”151 The distinction is absent 
from any avenue of constitutional analysis: 
Courts repeatedly reject the notion that any categorical rules about for-profits 
and nonprofits should be applied to control constitutional analysis. Instead of re-
lying on the profit distinction, courts focus on the nature of the activity at issue, 
which governs the availability of constitutional rights. Thus, any argument to 
invest the profit distinction with determinative force in the religious liberty con-
text would need to explain why a distinction that apparently carries no weight in 
other parts of the First Amendment—even elsewhere within the Religion 
Clause—should be viewed as categorical and dispositive where religious exer-
cise rights are concerned.152 
At least in the context of the First Amendment, there is no basis for concluding 
that profit motive is determinative of a party’s rights. 
In the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent 
disparaged the significance of Braunfeld and Lee as “hardly impressive authori-
ty” because the claims were “promptly rejected on the merits.”153 While true 
that the claims were not ultimately successful, Justice Ginsburg’s attack is ir-
relevant to the present discussion. Whether a party will ultimately be successful 
in asserting its rights in a particular challenge does not speak to whether the 
rights exist in the first place. The plaintiffs’ lack of ultimate success in Braun-
feld and Lee may have relevance to the discussion of merits in Hobby Lobby, 
but it says nothing about the threshold question of whether for-profit corpora-
tions can exercise religious rights. For that issue, the relevant feature of the 
cases is that Court’s willingness to entertain individuals’ claims of religious 
practice for activities that were embedded in profit-seeking undertakings. Be-
                                                        
147  Id. at 257. 
148  Id. at 261. 
149  366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
150  Id. 
151  Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d at 1214. (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
152  Rienzi, supra note 39, at 102. 
153  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). 
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cause the Court expressed no hesitation in allowing such cases to proceed, the 
profit motive cannot be deemed dispositive of the challenge here. 
 At least for individuals, the Court’s unwillingness to distinguish between 
for-profit and non-profit activities reflects the practical realities of the world: 
Perhaps profit-making is not a religious enterprise, but those who engage in 
profit-making enterprises can still have religious convictions that require them to 
do or refrain from doing certain things in their businesses. The Constitution does 
not require compartmentalization of the psyche, saying that one’s religious per-
sona can participate only in nonprofit activities.154 
In many instances it may be impossible to distinguish between people’s per-
sonal beliefs and their business activities. “In addition, sincerely religious per-
sons could find a connection between the exercise of religion and the pursuit of 
profit. Would an incorporated kosher butcher really have no claim to challenge 
a regulation mandating non-kosher butchering practices?”155 The same question 
could be asked about a Christian publishing house that devotes the vast majori-
ty of its profits to religious activities.156 As the Supreme Court’s precedents in-
dicate, the mere fact that a party—be it an individual or a corporation—is orga-
nized as a profit-seeking entity does not render it categorically incapable of 
exercising religion. 
D. Logical Application of Precedent Requires That Free Exercise Protections 
Extend to For-Profit Corporations 
 Because incorporated entities can assert free exercise rights and individuals 
can practice their religion in a profit-seeking context,157 there seems little logi-
cal reason to deny free exercise rights to for-profit corporations. Yet in Hobby 
Lobby, the government seemed to argue that “Free Exercise rights somehow 
disappear” when these two elements are combined.158 This position is simply 
unsupportable given the weight of precedent to the contrary. The government 
never offered a cogent argument for why the combination of two typically ir-
relevant factors would suddenly become dispositive. 159 
 The recognition of religious rights for non-profit corporations is particular-
ly damning for those who oppose acknowledging the rights of for-profit corpo-
rations. This was a necessary concession because, as the Tenth Circuit wrote, it 
                                                        
154  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1148 (10th Cir. 2013) (Hartz, J., 
concurring). 
155  Id. at 1135. 
156  John B. Stanton, Comment, Keeping the Faith: How Courts Should Determine “Sincere-
ly-Held Religious Belief” in Free Exercise of Religion Claims by For-Profit Companies, 59 
LOY. L. REV. 723, 744 (2013). 
157  Rienzi, supra note 39, at 60. 
158  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1134. 
159  Gaylord, supra note 130, at 609–10 (“Yet these courts have not explained why the two 
types of corporations—for-profit and non-profit—should be treated differently for free exer-
cise purposes.”). 
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is “beyond question” and “obvious [that] the Free Exercise Clause at least ex-
tends to associations like churches—including those that incorporate.”160 Elim-
inating a corporation’s rights simply because it seeks profit would be unjusti-
fied when the Supreme Court has acknowledged that profit-seeking behavior 
does not obviate religious rights for individuals. 
 Thus, opponents of corporate religious rights fall back on arguing that there 
is just something about corporations that render them incapable of exercising 
religion. Perhaps it is the “lack [of] anthropomorphic qualities” that prevents 
corporations from taking and observing religious action separate and apart from 
their individual members.161 But this argument would completely negate any 
recognition of corporate constitutional rights. After all, corporations cannot en-
gage in First Amendment speech activities apart from their membership, yet 
corporations enjoy speech rights.162 Further, it would negate any recognition of 
religious rights for non-profit corporations, a position that no court or reasoned 
commentator has yet adopted.  
Religious organizations . . . do not pray, worship, observe sacraments, or take 
other religious actions as a corporation. All such activities are conducted by the 
individuals who are part of that non-profit organization—the priests, religious, 
and lay members of the faith. The same holds true with respect to for-profit cor-
porations.163 
A corporation’s lack of humanity does not mean that it must also necessarily 
lack constitutional rights.  
 To the extent that we want to honor legal precedent and the strong policy 
reasons underlying it, there is a nearly inescapable logical conclusion that for-
profit corporations ought to enjoy protected religious rights. To find otherwise 
would be to engage in reasoning that attempts to cabin its conclusions to one 
context without a principled basis for distinguishing from other accepted con-
texts. Rather than engage in artificial line-drawing, courts should recognize that 
for-profit corporations can, in fact, exercise religion and are thus entitled to 
protection under the First Amendment. 
E. Lack of Previous Recognition Not Dispositive 
 As just discussed, there is a strong argument from analogies to past cases 
that for-profit corporations retain a constitutionally protected right to exercise 
religion. But the inescapable fact is that the Supreme Court has never explicitly 
recognized this right.164 Nor, apparently, had any federal court before the pre-
                                                        
160  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1133–34. 
161  See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 398 n.14 (3d Cir. 2013) (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
162  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010); First Nat. Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 (1978). 
163  Gaylord, supra note 130, at 645. 
164  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., in 
chambers); Micah Schwartzman & Nelson Tebbe, Obamacare and Religion and Arguing Off 
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sent round of litigation.165 Indeed, “during the 200-year span between the adop-
tion of the First Amendment and RFRA’s passage, the Supreme Court consist-
ently treated free exercise rights as confined to individuals and non-profit reli-
gious organizations.”166 The challenges to the Obamacare mandate were un-
uncharted legal territory. 
 This lack of precedent becomes more striking when compared to the 
recognition of other corporate rights, even within the First Amendment.167 For 
instance, in Citizens United, where the Supreme Court reaffirmed the free 
speech rights of corporations, it cited more than twenty cases where the Court 
had recognized the free speech rights of corporations.168 The Court in Hobby 
Lobby had no similar string of precedent from which to draw. But it is an error 
to assume that the lack of any previous recognition of the corporate right to free 
exercise indicates that the right just does not exist. 
 First, the obvious counter to this argument is that there is no precedent stat-
ing that for-profit corporations lack free exercise rights.169 The mandate chal-
lenges presented a truly novel legal issue in that there was no direct precedent 
either way. Everything had to be argued by analogy. The inability of propo-
nents of corporations’ right to exercise religion to point to definitive precedent 
is counterbalanced by the inability of opponents to point to precedent directly 
supporting their position. Given the arguments from analogy discussed above, 
this precedential draw favors those who support corporate religious rights. 
 Moreover, as discussed throughout this section, recognition of corporate 
religious rights is consistent with the Court’s broader interpretation of corporate 
rights,170 even if the Court has never held that corporations can exercise reli-
gion. Analogizing prior cases favors recognition of corporate religious rights 
under the First Amendment. 
 Still, the lack of precedent does beg the question of why, if the right actual-
ly exists, it has not been asserted and litigated previously. Two factors may be 
at issue. The first is that government regulation is becoming increasingly perva-
sive in American life, causing it to touch on more areas than in previous eras.171 
                                                                                                                                 
the Wall, SLATE (Nov. 26, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_poli 
tics/jurisprudence/2013/11/obamacare_birth_control_mandate_lawsuit_how_a_radical_arg 
ument_went_mainstream.html (“Never has the Supreme Court suggested that profit-seeking 
companies may exercise religious freedom rights.”). Even the Court’s Hobby Lobby decision 
did not squarely address this point given that the Court based its decision on statutory RFRA 
grounds. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014). 
165  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1166 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 384. 
166  Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1168 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part). 
167  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 384–85. 
168  Id. at 384. 
169  Id. at 399 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
170  See supra Part III.D. 
171  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 399 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
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One judge has suggested that “there has never before been a government policy 
that could be perceived as intruding on religious liberty as aggressively as the 
Mandate, so there has been little reason to address the issue.”172 If it is true that 
government regulation is affecting avenues of religious practice that simply had 
not been implicated before, there should be no surprise that court challenges are 
increasing. After all, there is no point (nor standing) in litigating to assert rights 
that have not been infringed. Second, at least one scholar has described the 
“rise of the ‘religiously expressive corporation.’ ”173 He writes that an increase 
in religious and spiritual beliefs and practices in American society has corre-
spondingly increased the religious practices of American corporations.174 This 
would naturally lead to greater religious practice from ostensibly secular and 
profit-seeking entities. Combined with increasing government regulation, this 
creates an almost inevitable conflict as rising government regulations collide 
with increased religious practices. That these two trends seem to be occurring 
simultaneously provides a reasonable explanation for why litigation would 
arise now and never before.  
At bottom, the novelty of a constitutional claim has only limited worth in 
evaluating its merits. Here, the lack of precedent in favor of granting corpora-
tions free exercise rights is offset by the lack of precedent denying those rights. 
Further, the gap in the jurisprudential record is explained by concurrent trends 
in American society and governmental regulation. Even without direct prece-
dent, there is sufficient analogous precedent to establish that corporate free ex-
ercise rights are consistent with the constitutional tradition. At the very least, 
the lack of direct precedent does not dispositively negate the existence of such 
rights. Doing so would freeze the law—and the rights it recognizes—in its pre-
sent state, which would work to the detriment of constitutional liberties. 
F. Corporate Conscience Is Recognized in Other Contexts 
 One of the most powerful arguments against recognizing the rights of cor-
porations to exercise religion is that corporations lack the capacity to believe 
anything at all beyond the imperative to earn a profit. This seems particularly 
true when a corporation has a diverse set of shareholders who are not necessari-
ly bound by any common spiritual or moral beliefs.175 This view, however, 
                                                        
172  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 399 (Jordan, J., dissenting). 
173  Colombo, supra note 126, at 16. 
174  Id. Colombo notes that this trend toward increased religiosity is seemingly at odds with 
statistics showing an increase in the number of Americans who do not identify as members 
of a particular religion. Studies show, however, that belief in God, attendance at religious 
services, frequency of prayer, and individuals who say that religion is “very important” to 
their lives have remained steady. Thus, it appears that Americans remain just as religious or 
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nized religion. Id. at 17. 
175  See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2795–96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The dis-
tinction between a community made up of believers in the same religion and one embracing 
persons of diverse beliefs, clear as it is, constantly escapes the Court’s attention.”). 
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overlooks the fact that socially responsible corporations regularly demonstrate 
commitments to ideals beyond pure profit. Indeed, corporate values “are of in-
creasing concern to investors” who “screen their investment decisions with re-
course to factors that are moral and ethical in nature.”176 
 Examples of corporate conscience are legion. Some of the most prevalent 
corporations in our society take on issues far broader than merely turning a 
profit: 
Take, for example, Starbucks, a publicly traded for-profit corporation, which 
frequently campaigns for same-sex equality, promoting cases and initiatives that 
support that cause. Not all Starbucks employees, customers, or shareholders may 
agree with the views of the corporation, but in our corporate world it is an ac-
cepted fact that corporations can assert their viewpoints on religion, politics, en-
vironmental issues, and civil rights.177 
Ben & Jerry’s Ice Cream provides another clear example. The Ben & Jerry’s 
website provides a link called “Values” where customers can learn about the 
corporation’s product, economic, and social missions.178 The website details the 
corporation’s work across multiple causes—including climate justice, marriage 
equality, and “peace building”—that have little to do with business profits from 
selling ice cream.179 “A shopping trip to Whole Foods or a lunch at Chipotle 
confirms that businesses frequently have ethical, moral, or philosophical com-
mitments beyond mere profit maximizing.”180 
 All of these examples highlight the fundamental flaw of insisting that secu-
lar for-profit corporations are required to focus exclusively on profits. They 
demonstrate that such corporations “are regularly understood as being capable 
of acting on a wide range of subjective beliefs or intentions: ethical views, 
philosophical views, criminal intentions, anti-religious animus, etc.”181 This is a 
socially desirable outcome and one that the law often encourages.182 
 But if corporations can form and act upon subjective ethical and philosoph-
ical beliefs—as corporations like Ben & Jerry’s inarguably do—what stops 
them from forming and acting upon religious beliefs? Drawing such a line 
would seem to be the very soul of caprice. Indeed, “[t]here is no basis in law or 
                                                        
176  Colombo, supra note 126, at 22. 
177  Elissa Graves, The Corporate Right to Free Exercise of Religion: The Affordable Care 
Act and the Contraceptive Coverage Mandate, 18 TEX. REV. LAW & POL. 199, 219 (2014). 
178  BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). 
179  Issues We Care About, BEN & JERRY’S, http://www.benjerry.com/values/issues-we-care-
about (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). That Ben & Jerry’s has registered as a benefit corporation 
(or “B Corp”) does not undermine this argument. See BEN & JERRY’S HOMEMADE ICE 
CREAM, http://www.benjerry.com/about-us/b-corp (last visited Aug. 3, 2015). Regardless of 
the organizing law, it is indisputable that Ben & Jerry’s—as a corporation—has demonstrat-
ed philosophical and ethical commitments. A review of its website indicates that these com-
mitments pre-dated the corporation’s decision to establish itself as a “B Corp.” Id. 
180  Rienzi, supra note 39, at 110. 
181  Id. 
182  Id. 
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logic to say that corporations can form moral views about ethics, philosophy, 
and the environment, but not about religion.”183 If a corporation is capable of 
forming one set of beliefs, it is equally capable of forming the other. “One way 
for corporations to increase their corporate social responsibility is through the 
adoption of a religious identity.”184 Moreover, any attempt to cabin corporate 
actions to exclude religious practice in favor of profit-seeking would likewise 
limit individuals’ ability to advance their values through the corporate form.185 
Americans accept and, perhaps, expect that corporations will take on causes 
and issues broader than the mere sale of coffee, ice cream, and burritos.186 It is 
a small step from recognizing a corporation’s secular ethical beliefs to recog-
nizing its religious beliefs. Just as we would not balk at the first, we should not 
reject the second. 
 Further, other areas of the law treat corporations as capable of forming 
specific mental intent. For instance, holding a corporation liable in criminal 
prosecutions necessarily requires the recognition that the corporation can pos-
sess the mens rea necessary for a crime.187 Likewise, “discrimination law rec-
ognizes that a for-profit business can have a religious identity when it is dis-
criminated against, and can form and act on beliefs about religion when it is 
found guilty of religious discrimination.”188 Once we accept that corporations 
have the power to form intent, identity, and ethical beliefs, there is no reason to 
draw an arbitrary line that excludes religious beliefs. There is nothing so inher-
ently unique about religious belief that it cannot fit within the practices we al-
ready commonly associate with corporations. Logic and common sense will not 
allow it. 
G. Religion and Commerce Overlap in Meaningful Ways 
 It is a mistake to assume that because for-profit corporations are formed 
with the primary intent of earning a profit they cannot also serve a religious 
purpose. But this is a common argument. After all, the Bible commands that 
“[y]ou cannot serve both God and money.”189 Certainly, most for-profit corpo-
rations do not have a religious component. But the fact that most corporations 
                                                        
183  Id. 
184  Julie Marie Baworowsky, From Public Square to Market Square: Theoretical Founda-
tions of First and Fourteenth Amendment Protection of Corporate Religious Speech, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1713, 1714 (2008) (indicating that corporations are seemingly ex-
pected to take on certain social responsibilities). 
185  Gaylord, supra note 130, at 633–34. 
186  Rienzi, supra note 39, at 84. 
187  Id. at 86. 
188  Id. at 94 (hypothesizing that a corporation would have standing to sue if a state declined 
to do business with it because of its religious actions and that a company could be found lia-
ble for discriminating against individuals based on their religion). 
189  Matthew 6:24 (New International). 
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are secular does not mean that the minority of corporations who do exercise re-
ligion should not be protected.190 
 Reducing corporate purpose to a single factor ignores the reality of the 
world in which people often act from a mixed variety of motivations.191 For 
many individuals, religious faith “permeates all aspects of their lives” and car-
ries over into business associations and practices.192 This should not be surpris-
ing. Despite the Bible’s admonition about not serving two masters, nearly all of 
the major religions practiced in America describe some rules and practices for 
dealing with commerce.193 In reality, there is not an unbridgeable gulf between 
the religious and the secular worlds, even when it comes to commerce. Nor 
does the law set up an impermeable barrier between these two domains.194 Cer-
tain financial and business laws touch on what is otherwise religious activity.195 
Likewise, the law should allow religious protections to touch on what is other-
wise commercial activity. 
 Acknowledging the reach of religion into the realm of commerce reflects 
an understanding of reality and properly recognizes individual rights. After all, 
“if America stands by its historically robust religious pluralism, all individuals 
and groups—including corporations—should be able to bring religion not only 
to the public square, but also to the market square.”196 A variety of authors ad-
dressing the subject have indicated that business corporations could (or even 
should) adopt religious thinking and attitudes into their corporate practices.197 
The introduction of religion into the market square is underway. Professor Co-
lombo has described the rise of the “religiously expressive corporation.”198 
                                                        
190  Baworowsky, supra note 184, at 1723. 
191  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 296. 
192  Gaylord, supra note 130, at 621. 
193  See Rienzi, supra note 39, at 67–73 (illustrating the interactions between commerce and 
religion in the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions). 
194  Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 889 (2008) 
(“Although the Supreme Court opinions demonstrate a willingness to treat apparently com-
mercial activities as falling outside the purview of the financial immunity accorded to reli-
gious activity under taxation and other regulatory schemes, they tend not to separate out reli-
gious from commercial activity per se.”). 
195  Id. at 912. 
196  Baworowsky, supra note 184, at 1777. 
197  See, e.g., id. at 1714 (“One way for corporations to increase their corporate social respon-
sibility is through the adoption of a religious identity.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and 
Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 3 (2006) (“A business corporation, 
however, is not, and need not be, inherently secular in nature. Rather, in various ways, its 
affairs can reflect religious views of both the larger society in which it functions and the sen-
ior decision-makers who direct its activities.”); Susan J. Stabile, Using Religion to Promote 
Corporate Responsibility, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 846 (2004) (“I propose here an al-
ternative view of the person and her relation to the world, one rooted in religion, in an effort 
to influence how academics and others think and talk about the social obligations of corpora-
tions and to suggest a broader notion of the appropriate role of law in regulating corporate 
entities.”). 
198  Colombo, supra note 126, at 16. 
16 NEV. L.J. 1, MOORE - FINAL.DOCX 1/15/16  1:01 PM 
Fall 2015] CORPORATE RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 33 
Among the factors giving rise to such corporations are increased religiosity in 
general American society, a growing number of “religious entrepreneur[s],” 
and growing religiosity among business executives.199 These religious individ-
uals, in turn, “impose religiously motivated policies on corporations all the 
time.”200 
 The factors just described are having a discernible effect on business prac-
tices throughout the country. “Religion infuses much of American commerce, 
including a $4.6 billion Christian products industry, a $12.5 billion kosher food 
market, and a growing share of an $800 billion global sharia-compliant finance 
market. Moreover, numerous mutual funds confine investments to firms whose 
activities reflect investors’ religious precepts.”201 Professors Meese and Oman 
have assembled numerous examples of corporations demonstrating a high de-
gree of religious practice in their corporate activities.202 For instance, a Virginia 
supermarket chain closed on the Sabbath, refused to sell alcohol, and encour-
aged weekly employee worship.203 Similarly, the authors refer to numerous ko-
sher butcher shops and delis that exemplify religious belief infusing economic 
practice.204 In each of the examples, the corporation has adopted a set of reli-
gious beliefs into its fundamental practices, often with no clear link to in-
creased profits. It blinks reality to claim that a for-profit corporation is incapa-
ble of religious exercise. These corporations have demonstrably adopted some 
degree of religious identity and act in accordance with it. In such contexts, legal 
recognition of the rights that come with religious practice is both just and prop-
er. 
H. Protecting Corporations Vindicates Individual Rights 
 Although corporations and their shareholders must be kept analytically dis-
tinct for purposes of determining corporate beliefs and actions,205 “we should 
not be seduced by the fiction of corporate personality into imagining that when 
we regulate corporations we are not regulating individuals.”206 In reality, re-
stricting corporate rights in turn limits the rights available to individuals: 
Depriving corporations of religious liberty simultaneously deprives individuals 
of the right to freely exercise their religion by means of a for-profit, corporate 
undertaking. It relegates their career choices to the non-profit world and restricts 
the opportunities they might otherwise have to invest in and patronize estab-
                                                        
199  Id. at 16, 20–21. 
200  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 274. 
201  Id. at 278 (internal footnotes omitted). 
202  Id. at 278–79; see also Rienzi, supra note 39, at 75 (describing Afrik Grocery and Halal 
Meat, which operates in accordance with Muslim religious beliefs). 
203  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 278. 
204  Id. at 278–79. 
205  See infra Part IV.B.1. 
206  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 295. 
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lishments that are wholly consistent with their most deeply-held principles and 
beliefs.207 
In this sense, for-profit corporations can be viewed as associations formed 
“around a common vision or shared set of goals, values, or beliefs.”208 Just as 
the First Amendment protects such associations when they are non-profit enti-
ties, so too should it protect associations whose primary purpose is seeking 
profit. 
 Viewed in this light, the recognition of corporate religious rights in broad 
contexts—including the for-profit setting—is but another valuable means to 
protect individual rights. Protecting religious expression by for-profit corpora-
tions in addition to purely religious entities such as churches and religious non-
profit organizations permits another avenue for people to live their religious 
faith. Conversely, limiting corporate rights limits individuals’ abilities to prac-
tice religion in the full scope of their lives.209 This is not to say that corpora-
tions and the individuals behind them should be treated as one and the same. 
Rather, it simply recognizes that corporations do not exist in a vacuum. Deny-
ing corporations rights is not without effect on the individuals who formed and 
operate those corporations. Where those individuals intended the corporation to 
act as a means of religious expression—and where the corporation itself actual-
ly demonstrates a degree of religious commitment—protecting the corpora-
tion’s rights redounds to the benefit of the individuals, thus complying with the 
general purpose of the First Amendment.210  
I. Recognizing Corporate Rights Does Not Necessarily Determine Case 
Outcomes 
 Finally, it is important to note that recognizing for-profit corporations’ re-
ligious rights does not automatically provide exemptions from general laws or 
give corporate employers unfettered power to impose their religious beliefs on 
employees. Rather, recognizing these rights merely allows a corporation the 
opportunity “to have its day in court, to litigate through the competing interests 
of the company and those of the government, and to have the matter resolved 
by a neutral judge in accordance to whatever standard is applicable under the 
circumstances.”211 This is a more appropriate and just means to decide such 
                                                        
207  Colombo, supra note 126, at 36. 
208  Id. at 53. 
209  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 295 (“When we regulate corporations we in fact burden 
the individuals who use the corporate form to pursue their goals.”). 
210  Graves, supra note 177, at 215 (“The corporation’s free exercise right must be protected 
in order to protect the free exercise right of its owners.”); but see generally Jennifer Jorczak, 
Note, “Not Like You and Me”: Hobby Lobby, the Fourteenth Amendment, and What the 
Further Expansion of Corporate Personhood Means for Individual Rights, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 285 (2014) (arguing that recognition of corporate rights will harm the rights of corpo-
rate employees who do not share the corporation’s beliefs). 
211  Colombo, supra note 126, at 68; see also Gaylord, supra note 130, at 654 (“To recognize 
that corporations . . . can raise a free exercise claim is not to determine that a particular cor-
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cases than simply denying corporations the opportunity to assert their rights. 
Rather than manipulate legal definitions or engage in dubious line drawing be-
tween who (or what) can assert particular beliefs, my proposal allows for a con-
sideration of the merits of the question raised, allowing courts to consider the 
significance of the religious burden, the nature and intent of the burden, and the 
interests involved on both sides. 
 Moreover, most free exercise claims brought by corporations under the 
First Amendment are unlikely to be successful given the Supreme Court’s ju-
risprudence since Smith. 212 Under this standard, the only laws that anyone 
could successfully challenge as free exercise violations are those that intention-
ally targeted religious belief and practices. Those blatantly unconstitutional 
laws and regulations should be challenged, and there is no injustice in allowing 
challenges from all who are adversely affected. Even under the more challeng-
er-friendly strict scrutiny regime established by RFRA, there are multiple de-
vices to defeat non-meritorious claims that do not involve categorically barring 
worthy parties from bringing suit.213 It could be found that the regulations do 
not substantially burden religion, or that the government has a compelling in-
terest in the regulation.214 Recall that in the Hobby Lobby decision, the four dis-
senting justices would have held that the contraception mandate survived 
RFRA’s compelling interest standard, assuming that for-profit corporations 
could bring the suit.215 
 Additionally, there have been a series of interesting proposals regarding 
how corporate religious rights—once recognized—ought to be balanced against 
competing governmental and individual interests. One proposal calls for a re-
conceived standard for corporate claims to parallel the commercial speech doc-
trine. Under this model, where a corporation exercises religion in a commercial 
context, the government must demonstrate a substantial (rather than compel-
ling) interest for the law, and the law’s fit must be reasonably related (rather 
than least restrictive).216 This would reflect the “difference between practicing 
one’s religious beliefs in the personal sphere—an area traditionally protected 
                                                                                                                                 
poration’s free exercise claim has merit. Rather, acknowledging that corporations can invoke 
the Free Exercise Clause simply permits corporations to litigate their claims and to have a 
neutral court apply the appropriate standard under the circumstances—be that rational basis, 
strict scrutiny, or something else.”). 
212  See generally Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that religious freedom 
does not excuse an individual from the obligation to comply with valid and neutral laws of 
general applicability that only incidentally infringe upon the exercise of religion); see also 
Storman’s, Inc. v. Wiesman, No. 12-35221, 2015 WL 4478084, at *13 (9th Cir. July 23, 
2015) (holding that religious challenge brought by pharmacy owner and two pharmacists to 
rules requiring that they sell emergency contraceptives failed under rational basis review). 
213  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 289. 
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215  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797–803 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
216  Danieli Evans, Commercial Religious Exercise: Translating the Commercial Speech 
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from government regulation—and practicing one’s beliefs during the course of 
a commercial relationship—an area traditionally subject to government regula-
tion.”217 Another proposal calls for granting preference to individual rights in 
instances where they come into conflict with corporate religious rights.218 Ac-
cording to this conception, “where the rights of a corporate person would be in 
direct conflict, yet of equal and balanced weight, with those of natural persons, 
such a tie should go to the natural persons, by virtue of the natural person’s 
humanity.”219 Both authors present provocative ideas, though full consideration 
of them falls outside the scope of this article. I mention them here merely to in-
dicate that there are multiple mechanisms for properly weighing corporate reli-
gious rights short of totally denying that those rights exist. 
 Recognition of corporate free exercise rights does not mean that those 
rights will always be upheld in court any more than recognizing individuals’ 
religious rights ensures that every one of those challenges will be successful. 
Rather, recognizing that for-profit corporations can exercise religion allows 
those corporations to have their day in court and assert their rights through our 
legal system. Despite the hyperbole surrounding the issues here, allowing the 
free and full assertion of rights will benefit our society and the individuals 
within it. We should not use artificial limitations to prevent worthy parties from 
asserting their rights.  
* * * 
This section has laid out the case for why the First Amendment’s guarantee 
of the right to freely exercise religion protects for-profit corporations. Fair-
minded application of the Supreme Court’s precedents and consideration of 
policy allow for no other result. There is no principled basis for distinguishing 
for-profit corporations from the individuals and organizations with undisputed 
First Amendment rights. Recognizing corporate free exercise rights ensures the 
full expression of religious liberty for organizations and the individuals behind 
them. 
IV. A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS 
 Having laid out the case for why for-profit corporations ought to enjoy free 
exercise rights under the First Amendment, this article will now discuss what 
recognition of that right should look like as a practical matter. This section will 
explain how courts faced with a corporate free exercise claim should evaluate 
that claim. I argue that courts ought to apply a sincerity test like that already 
applied to individuals asserting free exercise claims. For corporations, however, 
the operative question is whether the corporation, as a corporation, has demon-
strated sincere religious beliefs. Only those corporations that have demonstrat-
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ed through their own corporate actions a commitment to a particular set of reli-
gious beliefs would be able to successfully assert a free exercise claim under 
the First Amendment. 
A. The Need for and Benefits of a Threshold Sincerity Test 
 A threshold test is necessary for any assertion of constitutional rights to 
prevent the First Amendment from becoming “a limitless excuse for avoiding 
all unwanted legal obligations.”220 While courts are barred from questioning the 
underlying truth of religious beliefs, the Supreme Court “has consistently main-
tained that some judicial scrutiny of these assertions is nevertheless required, 
for laws cannot effectively bind if judges are willing to grant exemptions under 
the Free Exercise Clause to those whose asserted motives are insincere or non-
religious.”221 The First Amendment is not a blank check to ignore valid laws. 
 More pointedly, using sincerity as a gatekeeping device prevents corpora-
tions (and individuals) from asserting sham religious claims designed to obtain 
preferential treatment and exemptions from laws. Simply put, “[r]eligion-based 
exemptions create incentives for people to feign religiosity.”222 These feigned 
beliefs are not properly entitled to protection under the free exercise clause.223 
Thus, there must be some framework to differentiate between parties with gen-
uine beliefs worthy of protection and those who seek exemptions under the 
mere guise of religiosity. As the Second Circuit has realized, this is the true 
value of employing a sincerity test to parties claiming religious exemptions: 
Sincerity analysis seeks to determine an adherent’s good faith in the expression 
of his religious belief. This test provides a rational means of differentiating be-
tween those beliefs that are held as a matter of conscience and those that are an-
imated by motives of deception and fraud. The latter variety, of course, must be 
subject to governmental invasion, lest our society abjure from distinguishing be-
tween the incantation of “sincerely held religious beliefs” as a talisman for self-
indulgence or material gain and those beliefs genuinely dictated by con-
science.224 
In providing a rational method for separating actual religious claims from op-
portunistic parties seeking only “self-indulgence or material gain,” a sincerity 
test offers a vital tool for analyzing free exercise claims. 
 Religious sincerity is the appropriate inquiry here because the free exercise 
clause only protects religious activities. An action that is not motivated by reli-
                                                        
220  2 RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 7:15 (4th ed. 2014) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 859 (1978)). 
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gious belief is not a religious exercise.225 Where actors lack sincere religious 
beliefs, their actions cannot truly be motivated by those alleged beliefs. The 
free exercise clause does not extend so far. “Unlike freedom of speech, freedom 
of conscience does not protect the insincere.”226 Fair application of a sincerity 
test runs no risk of infringing religious liberty because, when applied correctly, 
it only excludes from protection actions by individuals who are not truly exer-
cising religion. Exclusion of insincere religious beliefs does not—and cannot—
violate the First Amendment. 
 Moreover, focusing on sincerity offers a flexible and universally applicable 
rule to determine eligibility for religious exemptions. The test is not contingent 
upon immaterial distinctions such as profit motive, ownership structure, or tax 
status.227 Rather, an inquiry into sincerity can be undertaken in a broad range of 
contexts for a broad range of actors. Thus, it appears to be “the most promising 
approach for separating bona fide claims from spurious ones.”228 Further, sin-
cerity is “akin to good faith and other mental states that the law has for years 
made relevant to a wide variety of questions.”229 Determining sincerity falls 
well within the bounds of judicial competence. 
 The adaptability and flexibility of the sincerity test likely explains its wide 
use and acceptance in a wide range of free exercise claims. Sincerity is general-
ly regarded as the threshold test for such claims.230 Thus, courts typically read 
“sincerity requirements into federal statutes granting religious exemptions.”231 
For instance, courts applying RFRA have regularly rejected claims where they 
found the challenger’s religious beliefs to be insincere.232 Beyond RFRA, 
courts have employed sincerity review to cases “examining whether to grant a 
tax exemption, an exemption from school immunization programs, or protec-
tion of prisoners’ religious practices. Other cases addressing religious sincerity 
include actions for unemployment benefits, defamation, child support, con-
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tempt of court, and civil fraud.”233 Even the Army’s regulations reflect a focus 
on sincerity when considering the claims of conscientious objectors.234 The 
broad application of sincerity review across this wide range of contexts demon-
strates both the general acceptance of the test and its ability to provide helpful 
guidance when weighing free exercise claims. Just as it is a nearly indispensa-
ble device for considering individuals’ free exercise claims, so too can it pro-
vide meaningful assistance when considering the claims of corporations—both 
religious and for-profit. 
B. The Process for Determining Corporate Religious Beliefs 
1. Focus Must Be on the Corporation Itself 
 The first, and perhaps most important, step in assessing the religious be-
liefs of corporations is determining what exactly is being assessed. Much of the 
analysis of corporate religiosity in cases and academic literature conflates the 
religious beliefs of corporations with the religious beliefs of their sharehold-
ers.235 This is a mistake. “The first principle of corporate law is that for-profit 
corporations are entities that possess legal interests and a legal identity of their 
own—one separate and distinct from their shareholders.”236 Any test looking to 
determine the religious rights of a corporation is bound to consider the beliefs 
of the corporation alone. The beliefs of the corporation’s owners—who are le-
gally separate entities—is essentially irrelevant for these purposes. Arguing 
otherwise makes corporate protections “a one-way street: [the corporation’s] 
shareholders can get protection from tort or contract liability by standing be-
hind the veil, but the corporation can ask a court to disregard the corporate 
veil” when the shareholders seeks to assert a religious right through the corpo-
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ration.237 If the corporation itself seeks to assert religious rights, it must be the 
corporation itself that has rights to assert. 
 Recognizing the essential separateness of corporate and shareholder rights 
is well-established in Supreme Court law.238 For instance, in Domino’s Pizza, 
Inc. v. McDonald, the plaintiff alleged that Domino’s Pizza had broken its con-
tracts with the plaintiff’s corporation (of which he was the sole shareholder) 
because of racial animus directed at him personally.239 McDonald alleged that 
he had the right to bring suit personally against the company because, as sole 
shareholder, he “negotiated, signed, performed, and sought to enforce” the con-
tract against Domino’s.240 But the Court rejected this claim because the Dom-
ino’s contract was with McDonald’s corporation, not him personally.241 That a 
sole shareholder who demonstrated nearly complete identity with the corpora-
tion could not assert his own rights in this context indicates the degree of sepa-
ration with which the Court usually treats corporations and their shareholders. 
This separation should not be lessened simply because the asserted claims are 
religious as opposed to racial. 
 The essential separateness of corporations and their shareholders is crucial 
for properly analyzing the religious rights of corporations. It prevents purely 
secular corporations from asserting claims to religious exemptions based solely 
on the strong religious feelings among the corporation’s ownership. Further, 
this recognition indicates the proper focus where corporate and shareholder be-
liefs are in conflict. Consider, for example, a devout Muslim individual who 
runs a corporation—perhaps a Christian bookstore—according to Christian ten-
ets. “In such a scenario, nobody could reasonably argue that a law requiring the 
corporation to act in a way contrary to the Islamic beliefs of the owner—but in 
accordance with the Christian beliefs by which the corporation is run—violates 
the corporation’s free exercise rights.”242 Similarly, a Christian shareholder of 
a kosher butcher shop could assert a violation of Judaism on behalf of the cor-
poration, but not Christianity. If corporations are themselves exercising reli-
gion, “the religious beliefs of the owners are inapposite.”243 
 Importantly, this conceptual framework is unlikely to have any effect on 
the analysis of religious and religiously affiliated non-profit corporations. For 
                                                        
237  Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 236, at *14; Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“By incorporating a business, how-
ever, an individual separates herself from the entity and escapes personal responsibility for 
the entity’s obligations. One might ask why the separation should hold only when it serves 
the interest of those who control the corporation.”). 
238  See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (holding 
that the president and sole shareholder of corporation was a “person” distinct from the enter-
prise subject to liability under RICO). 
239  Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 473 (2006). 
240  Id. at 477. 
241  Id. 
242  Phillipps, supra note 135, at 59–60. 
243  Id. at 60. 
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those institutions, it is clear that the corporation itself is engaging in religious 
exercise. Further, those institutions tend to have a high degree of identification 
between the individuals behind the corporation and the corporation itself. 
While the test set out here is intended primarily as a means to determine the re-
ligious beliefs of for-profit corporations, the test would apply with equal ease 
and force to non-profit corporations. 
2. Holistic Analysis 
 When looking to the sincerity of a corporation’s religious beliefs as a cor-
poration, the analysis should look to the corporation in its entirety. The proper 
analysis is holistic, considering the corporation’s “formation, operation, and 
production all as parts pointing to one separate entity and that entity’s identi-
ty.”244 This type of analysis is not foreign to our legal system. For instance, ho-
listically analyzing the party asserting a claim is consistent with the military’s 
approach when considering applications for conscientious objector status. Ac-
cording to Department of Defense regulations, “[s]incerity is determined by an 
impartial evaluation of the applicant’s thinking and living in its totality, past 
and present.”245 Significantly, there is no single factor or practice that automat-
ically decides the issue in all instances. Rather, when determining the sincerity 
of corporations’ religious beliefs, each corporation must be considered in its 
entirety. 
3. The Analysis Is Focused on Fact-Finding Based on External Facts 
 Determining whether a corporation sincerely holds religious beliefs is es-
sentially a fact-finding task, necessarily focused on external facts. Determining 
sincerity necessarily requires inquiring into a party’s state of mind, which is 
“an awesome problem, capable of resolution only by reference to a panoply of 
subjective factors.”246 The analysis is “exceedingly amorphous” because the 
factfinder must rely on the available external evidence “to delve into the claim-
ant’s most veiled motivations.”247 Thus, objective facts are relevant to the ex-
tent that they shed light on the essentially subjective sincerity of the claim-
ant.248 A court must determine the subjective beliefs of a party based on the 
“extrinsic and objective evidence concerning the claimant’s actions, statements, 
and demeanor.”249 Through this, courts can determine “whether the religious 
                                                        
244  Stanton, supra note 156, at 766. 
245  Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 979 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting 32 C.F.R. 
§ 75.5(c)(2)). 
246  Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
247  Id. at 157. 
248  Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381 (1955). 
249  Lupu, supra note 228, at 954. 
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views the claimant offers in support of the claim are consistent with other man-
ifestations of the claimant’s beliefs.”250 
4. Sources of Information to Consider 
 Understanding that the assessment of a corporation’s sincerity depends on 
a holistic analysis of external facts about the corporation, the question then 
turns to what sources should be considered in this analysis. Simply, “any action 
or documentation that can fairly be ascribed to the corporate entity acts as evi-
dence of a sincerely-held religious belief.”251 The following list—which is by 
no means comprehensive—is designed to give some indication of the types of 
sources that would prove helpful to courts in examining a corporation’s reli-
gious sincerity:252 
• Corporate charter, articles of incorporation, bylaws, and mission 
statement 
• Manner in which the corporation conducts its day-to-day operations 
• Employee manuals and handbooks 
• Contracts 
• The corporation’s hours of operations (e.g., closing on the Sabbath) 
• The clientele or customers to whom the corporation markets its busi-
ness 
To reiterate, none of these sources is alone determinative and where there 
is conflicting evidence, those pieces of evidence must be weighed against each 
other. Further, other appropriate sources of information that could indicate the 
sincerity of the corporation’s beliefs ought to be considered. The above list, 
however, highlights some of the most fruitful points of focus for determining a 
corporation’s beliefs. 
 A holistic focus on the external and demonstrable aspects of a corpora-
tion’s beliefs—as evidenced by the actions of the corporation itself—offers 
courts the best means to determine the requisite sincerity of a corporation as-
serting a free exercise claim. In doing so, the sincerity test provides an im-
portant gatekeeping function that helps weed out sham religious claims by op-
portunistic corporations. Rather than erroneously focusing on the religious 
beliefs of corporate shareholders, this test addresses the rights of the party actu-
ally asserting the religious claim.  
                                                        
250  Id. 
251  Stanton, supra note 156, at 768. 
252  The following list is derived in large part from the amicus brief submitted by the Knights 
of Columbus on behalf of the non-governmental parties in the Hobby Lobby case. See Brief 
for the Knights of Columbus as Amici Curiae Supporting the Private Parties at 24, Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) 2014 WL 333883. 
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C. Factors to Consider When Assessing Corporate Free Exercise Claims  
 Drawing on the literature and jurisprudence surrounding religious sincerity 
tests for individuals, this section sets out a variety of factors for courts to con-
sider when determining the sincerity of a corporation’s religious beliefs. Each 
of the factors should be weighed in combination with the others with no single 
element being wholly determinative. 
1. Demonstrated Religiosity in Corporate Practice 
 This is perhaps the most obvious of the factors for a court to consider: 
namely, has the corporation demonstrated a general “pattern of conduct” 
through its corporate practices indicating a commitment to religious beliefs?253 
Again, the corporate entity itself must engage in this conduct, not merely its 
shareholders. 
 Corporate religious practice can take many forms. Most basic would be in-
clusion of religious beliefs and goals in the corporation’s articles of incorpora-
tion or statement of purpose.254 It could also take the form of religious practices 
such as prayers or worship services during work hours or at corporate meet-
ings.255 Likewise, religious literature made available in the workplace, chaplain 
services, or placement of religious objects and iconography on the corpora-
tion’s property would also help satisfy this standard.256 The more widespread 
the availability of religious services to employees of the corporation, the 
stronger the case for corporate practice. Closing the corporation’s business for 
the Sabbath and religious holidays could also be an indication of religious be-
liefs.257 Finally, where the corporation donates a significant portion of its prof-
its to religious charities, it can also be said to be evincing a degree of religious 
conviction.258 Where there is a complete absence of religious expression on the 
part of a corporation, its claims must be viewed more skeptically. 
 Significantly, though directed by the officers (and perhaps shareholders) of 
the corporation, the above actions must be taken by the corporation itself. For 
instance, the amount a shareholder—even a sole shareholder—donates of his 
own money to religious charities does not matter to the corporation’s identity or 
                                                        
253  See Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting AR 600-43 ¶ 1-
7.a.(5)(b)). 
254  Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 247; Stanton, supra note 156, at 769. 
255  Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 247; Stanton, supra note 156, at 769. 
256  Stanton, supra note 156, at 769. 
257  Id.; Brief for Azusa Pacific University, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 
20–21, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354). This, 
however, would be a weaker sign of corporate beliefs because without a broader context it 
would be difficult to tell whether the corporation was expressing its own beliefs or merely 
accommodating the beliefs of its employees. The federal government, for instance, closes on 
Christmas, though it can hardly be called a religiously active entity. 
258  Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 247; see also Stanton, supra note 156 (citing Tyndale 
House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 111 (D.D.C. 2012)). 
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beliefs. But when corporate money becomes involved, it is a different story. 
Where the corporation itself is donating money with a religious purpose, that 
action reflects upon the apparent beliefs adopted by the corporation. Only such 
explicitly corporate actions bear upon the sincerity of the corporation’s reli-
gious beliefs. 
2. Public Displays of Religion 
 Just as people do not “light a lamp and put it under a bowl,”259 the most ef-
fective indicators of corporate religiosity are those that are made publicly. If 
nothing else, these present the easiest elements to determine because they are 
put forth in the public sphere for all to see. The analysis necessarily focuses on 
the “outward manifestation of the beliefs asserted.”260 The more outwardly 
those beliefs are asserted, the simpler they are to ascertain.  
 Public statements and those made to the media on behalf of the corporation 
present clear examples of the kind of public displays that might be useful to 
courts.261 These statements would represent clear articulations of belief against 
which later claims of belief could be judged. Courts often look to an individu-
al’s statements—and the strength of those statements—when seeking to deter-
mine sincerity.262 There is no reason that a similar inquiry would not serve the 
analysis of corporate beliefs. 
3. The Length and Consistency of the Corporation’s Averred Beliefs 
 Related to the public expression of a corporation’s religious beliefs is the 
length and consistency with which it has expressed those beliefs.263 Particularly 
relevant would be evidence of beliefs before the imposition of the burden from 
which the party is seeking to be exempted.264 Those beliefs that have been pre-
viously and consistently asserted by the corporation are more likely to be sin-
cere and not a mere sham.265 
 The focus on length and consistency of beliefs has been particularly preva-
lent in cases brought by prisoners challenging prison conditions under 
                                                        
259  Matthew 5:15 (New International). 
260  Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 979 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting AR 600-43 ¶ 1-7.a.(5)(a 
)). 
261  Stanton, supra note 156, at 768–69. 
262  Brady, supra note 222, at 1454; Senn, supra note 223, at 341–42. 
263  Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The existence of a longstanding 
philosophical belief which has only recently, and to the claimant’s advantage, taken on theo-
logical overtones could certainly give rise to reasonable suspicion of dissimulation.”); Brady, 
supra note 222, at 1453; Senn, supra note 223, at 347. 
264  See Brady, supra note 222, at 1453. 
265  Brief for Azusa Pacific University, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 20–
21, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354) 2014 WL 
316717. 
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RLUIPA.266 In that context, the focus on consistency is helpful to prevent an 
inmate from “adopt[ing] a religion merely to harass the prison staff with de-
mands to accommodate his new faith.”267 While such concerns may not be as 
prevalent outside of the corrections system, the emphasis on length and con-
sistency is nonetheless helpful. Common sense tells us that longstanding reli-
gious beliefs that have been scrupulously followed are more likely to be sincere 
than recent—and perhaps opportunistic—conversions without a similar track 
record of adherence. 
 That said, “sincerity does not require perfect adherence to beliefs.”268 After 
all, “even the most sincere practitioner may stray from time to time.”269 Just as 
an individual is not required to demonstrate perfect faith and adherence to reli-
gious dictates from the moment they are born until the moment they assert a 
free exercise claim, for-profit corporations should not be held to such an unre-
alistic standard. Nonetheless, the length and consistency with which particular 
beliefs have been held and demonstrated provides an insight into the sincerity 
with which those beliefs are held. Where a for-profit corporation has demon-
strated a commitment to religious beliefs—as weighed in consideration of the 
other factors discussed in this section—consistently over an extended time pe-
riod, its sincerity ought to receive more credit. 
4. The Corporation’s Secular Interest and/or Willingness to Accept 
Hardship 
 Another factor courts should consider when assessing corporate free exer-
cise claims is the corporation’s secular interest in obtaining the claimed reli-
gious benefit. This holds a certain common sense appeal. It is certainly con-
ceivable that an individual or a corporation thwarted in pursuing a particular 
result might “decide to mask the cause in religious garb in order to bring it un-
der First Amendment protection.”270 For instance, in the context of conscien-
tious objector claims, the military instructs that “[i]nformation presented by the 
claimant should be sufficient to convince that the claimant’s personal history 
reveals views and actions strong enough to demonstrate that expediency or 
avoidance of military service is not the basis of his claim.”271 Where a corpora-
tion stands to enjoy significant secular gains, courts should take into account 
the possibility of “strategic behavior” from the corporation and grant less def-
                                                        
266  See, e.g., Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1984) (considering, among other 
factors, the “short-lived nature” of the plaintiff’s affiliation with his claimed religion). 
267  Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d 960, 963 (7th Cir. 1988). 
268  Moussazadeh v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 791 (5th Cir. 2012). 
269  Id. 
270  Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 684 (9th Cir. 1981). 
271  Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 979 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing 32 C.F.R. 
§ 75.5(c)(2)). 
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erence to claims where such behavior is likely to occur.272 This is not to say 
that such claims should be rejected as a matter of course. Rather, it reflects the 
fundamental understanding that secular benefits create an incentive to dissimu-
late that ought to be guarded against. 
 Conversely, where a corporation has demonstrated a “willingness to bear 
adverse consequences of the religious belief,” the claim has a greater right to be 
taken at face value.273 Kent Greenawalt, among others, has posited that claims 
of conscience that seem to bring no practical benefit to the claimant, yet risk 
invoking the ire of others, are more likely to be sincere than those claims that 
have a clear and unalloyed benefit for the claimant.274 “A person who has sub-
mitted to great hardship rather than deviate from a professed religious doctrine 
is unlikely to be feigning belief.”275 In the individual context, such statements 
generally refer to some form of persecution. While outright persecution may be 
possible in the corporate context, a more likely adverse consequence would be 
lost profits. For instance, refusing to sell certain profitable items or closing for 
business during what would otherwise be profitable times in the name of reli-
gious observance indicate a commitment to religion that supersedes secular in-
terests. Willingness to accept such hardships indicate a corporation’s sincere 
commitment to a set of religious beliefs and minimize the risk that the corpora-
tion is engaging in opportunistic behavior by asserting a religious claim. 
5. Corporation’s Governance Structure 
 Finally, courts looking to determine the sincerity of a corporation’s reli-
gious beliefs should conduct a limited inquiry into the corporation’s govern-
ance structure. This is emphatically a different inquiry than looking into the re-
ligious beliefs of its owners.276 Nor is the appropriate inquiry the size or 
ownership structure of the corporation. After all, both for-profit and non-profit 
corporations are capable of exercising religion regardless of their size. Rather, 
the question to ask is whether “the ownership structure of the corporation [is] 
designed to ensure continuity of its religious purposes even after the original 
founders have retired or died . . . .”277 
 The purpose of this inquiry is to create additional separation between the 
sincerity of the corporation itself and the sincerity of the owners and sharehold-
ers behind the corporation. Where the corporation’s religious purpose is de-
signed to transcend the current owners, the corporation’s beliefs are more likely 
to belong to the corporation itself as opposed to the ownership. In such a situa-
                                                        
272  Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 
327 (1986). 
273  Senn, supra note 223, at 341–42. 
274  Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of Conscience, 28 J. L. & POL. 91, 
103–04 (2013). 
275  Senn, supra note 223, at 343. 
276  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
277  Bainbridge, supra note 235, at 247. 
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tion, the corporation’s beliefs would endure even if shareholders have since 
adopted diametrically opposite religious views. When such a structure is built 
into the framework of the corporation itself, it becomes much easier to say that 
the corporation as an entity has demonstrated a sincere religious belief. 
V. CORPORATE FREE EXERCISE RIGHTS: OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES 
 To this point, this article has argued that courts ought to recognize the reli-
gious free exercise rights of for-profit corporations and explained how courts 
should go about evaluating such claims. Nevertheless, there are certain ques-
tions and objections that must be considered when recognizing this right. This 
section will highlight a few of those objections and offer brief responses.  
A.  Corporations Cannot Form Sincere Beliefs 
Perhaps the most frequently asserted contention against recognition of cor-
porate free exercise rights is that corporations lack the capacity to form reli-
gious beliefs. As such, critics assert that protecting the free exercise rights of 
corporations “would protect a null set. Being only creatures of positive law 
with defined and limited powers, corporations lack a spiritual element; as it has 
been observed numerous times, a corporation has no soul.”278 Because the free 
exercise clause protects the expression of religious belief, the alleged inability 
of corporations to form such beliefs, if true, would be fatal to their assertion of 
a protected right to exercise religion.279 
This line of argument, however, overlooks a crucial reality: the legal sys-
tem already protects the religious rights of incorporated (and unincorporated) 
entities that may themselves be incapable of forming religious beliefs. Consider 
the Catholic Church. As a church, it inarguably is engaged in the exercise of 
religion and would have standing to assert a violation of its tenets of faith.280 
The same holds true for religiously affiliated non-profit organizations. If we 
take seriously the claim that organizations are categorically incapable of form-
ing religious beliefs, we must conclude that churches and other religious organ-
                                                        
278  Rutledge, supra note 236, at 28 (internal quotation omitted); see also Phillipps, supra 
note 135, at 61 (“While a corporation may be run in accordance with a particular religious 
belief system, the corporation itself believes nothing.”). 
279  Rutledge, supra note 236, at 25; but see Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses 
Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 369, 377–78 (2013) (“A corpora-
tion clearly ‘speaks,’ but can a corporation ‘believe?’ Perhaps not, but the question may be 
misdirected, for the First Amendment does not protect religious belief; it protects the exer-
cise of religious belief. Exercise, belonging in the world of action, is within the ambit of cor-
porate capacity.”). 
280  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); see 
also Tushnet, supra note 113, at 76 (“Churches, including those organized as corporations, 
have such rights as churches . . . .”); but see Lupu, supra note 228, at 955–56 (positing that 
use of the sincerity test would prohibit religious institutions from making religious claims in 
their own right because “as artificial persons, they are no more capable of feeling commit-
ment than they are of feeling love, fear, or anger.”). 
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izations are similarly barred. Yet even the most strident opponents of corporate 
religious rights do not seem to go so far as to say that these organizations ought 
to lack free exercise rights. This presents an insurmountable obstacle for pro-
ponents of the argument that corporations cannot exercise religion because they 
cannot themselves form religious beliefs. Proponents of this argument may then 
try to argue that there is a difference between religious and secular organiza-
tions. To the extent that contention is true, it is a different argument. The inabil-
ity of corporations (or any collective entity) to form “belief” in the same way as 
individuals does not by itself totally negate the legal rights afforded the entity.  
B. Sincerity Is Difficult to Discern 
Although the sincerity test is accepted in cases where individuals assert a 
free exercise claim, it can be a difficult test to implement. As Kent Greenawalt 
has observed, “[t]he main problem about sincerity is the practical problem of 
assessing it by those who decide on the applications of an exemption.”281 This 
difficulty perhaps explains why courts and the government tend to avoid chal-
lenging the sincerity of an individual’s religious beliefs.282 “Determinations of 
sincerity are inherently uncertain; the question is internal to the claimant rather 
than external, and objective indicia can therefore only be suggestive, not de-
terminative, of sincere belief.”283 These difficulties do not, however, render the 
sincerity test unworkable for assessing corporate free exercise claims. 
While determining sincerity can be a difficult task, courts certainly have 
the “institutional competence” to distinguish between sincere beliefs and those 
advanced out of animus or some other purpose.284 Indeed, “[j]udging credibility 
is a staple of the adjudicatory and administrative processes . . . .”285 This core 
adjudicatory task is the root of the inquiry by courts applying the sincerity test 
to free exercise claims brought by individuals or by corporations. As the previ-
ous section indicated, there are clear, judicially manageable tools available for 
making such determinations.286 
Moreover, the difficulties of judging sincerity have not defeated the use of 
the test for individuals who assert free exercise claims. If the test is valid when 
applied to individual claims, it can only be invalid when applied to corporate 
claims if there is something ineradicably distinctive about corporations that 
render the test inoperative. Thus, the question turns to the difficulties in deter-
mining the beliefs of a collective entity. 
                                                        
281  Greenawalt, supra note 274, at 103. 
282  Pepper, supra note 272, at 326. 
283  Id. 
284  Wilson, supra note 226, at 1453. 
285  Pepper, supra note 272, at 328. 
286  See supra Part IV. 
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C. Judging Corporate Sincerity Poses Distinctive Challenges 
The more relevant challenge posed by recognizing corporate free exercise 
rights is determining whose individual beliefs matter when looking at the col-
lective whole. “For example, when we talk about a corporation’s free exercise 
rights, are we really just talking about the owners’, directors’, shareholders’, or 
employees’ beliefs in some circuitous fashion, or are we talking in some ways 
about the institution itself?”287 As I explain in Part IV, the operative beliefs 
must relate to the institution itself.288 But that then begs the question of how 
one determines who speaks on behalf of the institution.289 This problem would 
be exacerbated when—unlike what appeared to be the case in Hobby Lobby—
there is a difference of religious beliefs among the various corporate stakehold-
ers. The Jewish Social Policy Action Network’s amicus brief in Hobby Lobby 
addressed this issue head-on, posing a series of provocative questions, includ-
ing: 
• Who determines the beliefs of a for-profit corporation owned by family 
members who share the same faith but adhere to different levels of ob-
servance and follow different practices? 
. . . . 
• Whose beliefs constitute the beliefs of a private for-profit corporation 
owned by unrelated individuals of different faiths? 
• Can a simple majority of shareholders of a for-profit corporation de-
termine the [religious] claims to be asserted by the corporation?290 
These problems, however, are just as present in churches and religious 
non-profit organizations as they are in for-profit corporations. As Professor 
Corbin has written, there is a potential problem, even in the realm of churches, 
when the stated religious beliefs of the church’s hierarchy are at odds with the 
practiced faith of many of the church’s members.291 A court wading into the 
controversy to determine the beliefs of the organization “risks resolving a theo-
logical dispute about what qualifies as a central tenet of the faith.”292 Moreover, 
deference to the church’s leadership structure “means the courts always favor 
the most powerful members of the religious community, sometimes at the ex-
                                                        
287  Stanton, supra note 156, at 746. 
288  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
289  Garfield, supra note 144, at 11 (“Does the Board of Directors, the CEO, or the share-
holders holding a majority of the stock decide what the corporation’s religious values are?”). 
290  Brief for the Jewish Social Policy Action Network as Amici Curiae Supporting the Gov-
ernment at 13–15, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-
354) 2014 WL 356644. 
291  Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1469, 1475–76 
(2013). 
292  Id. at 1476. Although Professor Corbin refers to the centrality of a particular belief, the 
Supreme Court has held that centrality is an irrelevant consideration. See Emp’t Div., Dep’t 
of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886–87 (1990). Her argument, then, is 
perhaps better read as counseling against court involvement in simply determining the actual 
beliefs of the church. 
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pense of less powerful members and definitely at the expense of the people 
who will be burdened by the accommodation.”293 These are serious concerns 
and warrant pause. 
The concerns do not, however, require that we reject any form of organiza-
tional religious identity. Following Professor Corbin’s argument to its logical 
end would require rejection of any organization’s religious claims—including 
those brought by churches. This is simply an untenable position in a society 
that aims to broadly protect religious exercise. Perhaps courts ought not entirely 
defer to organizations asserting religious beliefs. But courts should not reject all 
claims where there may be some dissension among an organization’s various 
stakeholders and members. Rather, as discussed in more detail above, courts 
should look to the actual practices of the corporation as a corporation—its gov-
erning charter and overt actions—to determine the existence and extent of its 
religious beliefs. Certainly this does not entirely answer the objections that Pro-
fessor Corbin raises, but in light of the inescapable requirement that certain col-
lective religious claims be recognized, it does provide a principled, practical 
framework for courts as they wade into such controversies. 
Moreover, evaluating corporate sincerity could actually be an easier propo-
sition than determining a natural person’s sincerity. Because corporate entities 
lack a mind or intentionality in the traditional sense, the sincerity evaluation is 
necessarily focused entirely on external factors and actions.294 This external fo-
cus can offer a more straightforward of an inquiry than the evaluations a court 
must make when considering the hidden and often obscure motivations of an 
individual actor. To the extent that corporate and individual minds differ, the 
sincerity analysis may actually work better for corporations. 
D. Corporations Will Be Incentivized to Manipulate the System 
Another concern raised by the recognition of corporate religious rights is 
that corporations will be incentivized to fake purported religious beliefs as a 
means of avoiding legal responsibilities. Or, as one group of scholars won-
dered, “what would prevent a corporation from invoking religion essentially at 
will in order to obtain exemptions from generally applicable laws and regula-
tions that the corporation finds too costly?”295 This concern stands in sharp re-
lief given the “massive influence” that corporations possess over individuals’ 
daily lives.296 While a legitimate concern, it is not determinative of the question 
here. The possibility of individuals falsely claiming religious beliefs to escape 
legal responsibility in their private lives is not used as an argument against 
                                                        
293  Corbin, supra note 290, at 1476. 
294  See supra Part IV.C. 
295  Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 236, at 26–27. 
296  Vischer, supra note 279, at 397. 
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granting free exercise rights to individuals.297 Rather, this concern counsels in 
favor of careful consideration of purportedly religious corporations’ sincerity. 
This, too, is not without problems. A group of corporate and criminal law 
professors writing an amicus brief in favor of the government’s position in 
Hobby Lobby argued that determining a corporation’s sincerity would “entan-
gle” courts in adjudicating “complex (and potentially intrusive) questions” 
about a corporation’s beliefs.298 The professors paint this inquiry as judicially 
inappropriate, if not impossible.299 That, however, is an overstatement of the 
problems involved. First, courts already engage in inquiries to determine the 
sincerity of individuals’ beliefs with the Supreme Court’s blessing.300 The in-
quiry involved here is no more inappropriate than what would be involved 
when dealing with individuals’ beliefs. Moreover, the professors underestimate 
the amount of probative evidence on the subject. They claim that the evidence 
will typically consist of no more than “the views of shareholders that the regu-
lation burdens their personal beliefs and a board resolution adopting those be-
liefs as the corporation’s own.”301 This overlooks, however, what should be the 
central point of inquiry: the religious practices of the corporation as an enti-
ty.302 When the inquiry is properly conceived in this way, the judicial task be-
comes more manageable because it is focused on observable external factors. 
The focus on sincerity as determined by demonstrated corporate practice offers 
a practical framework to negate the possibility of corporations falsely claiming 
religious beliefs to escape legal responsibilities. Instead of looking to the words 
of the corporate shareholders, courts will be able to assess a corporation’s sin-
cerity of belief based on the totality of the corporation’s actions and statements. 
As discussed above, the myriad evidence available to courts conducting this in-
quiry will provide a firm grounding for sincerity determinations beyond merely 
taking corporate shareholders at their word. 
E. Not Every Corporation Does or Will Practice Religion 
Just because corporations can exercise religion, it does not mean that all 
will. Indeed, it is unquestioned that all individuals can exercise religion, but 
there are still many who do not.303 Given the realities of corporate ownership 
                                                        
297  See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (upholding individuals’ rights to 
assert religious beliefs as defense against criminal mail fraud charges). 
298  Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 295, at 26–27. 
299  Id. at 26–28. 
300  See generally United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); see also supra Part IV.A. 
301  Professors’ Amicus Brief, supra note 295, at 28. 
302  See supra Part IV.B.1. 
303  According to a 2015 report from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 22.8 per-
cent of Americans identify themselves as religiously unaffiliated. Religious Landscape Sur-
vey, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, (May 12, 2015), http://www.pewfor 
um.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/. 
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and the pressures of the marketplace, it is likely that most corporations will opt 
not to exercise religion: 
In the real world, of course, reliance on such mechanisms may be relatively rare. 
Shareholders of publicly held firms are likely quite diverse in their religious 
views (or lack thereof), and market pressure may deter large firms with diverse 
consumers and employees from adopting a particular religious stance. Still, 
while rare, we do not believe that such assertions are impossible.304 
In light of these considerations, one cannot assume that all corporations will 
exercise religion even if such a right is recognized. But it would be a non sequi-
tur to jump from there to the conclusion that no corporation can or will exercise 
religion. Even if the majority of American citizens did not exercise religion, the 
First Amendment would still protect the rights of the minority who did practice 
religion. So too, the lack of religiosity in most corporations cannot be validly 
deemed to undermine constitutional protections for those corporations that do 
practice religion. 
 Rather, the lack of universal religiosity points to the need for a means to 
determine whether a corporation actually exercises its religion or whether the 
corporation is purely secular. Just as the First Amendment does not protect the 
religious exercise of individuals who do not exercise religion, it will not protect 
corporations without religious beliefs. As explained more fully above, focusing 
on the sincerity of a corporation’s beliefs, as manifest in its practices, provides 
just such a mechanism.305 
F. Only Small, Closely Held Corporations Should Be Able To Assert 
Religious Rights 
 Much of the discussion in the literature around corporate free exercise 
rights focuses on closely held corporations. This may be because most of the 
corporate free exercise claims so far have been brought by corporations “owned 
by one or just a few shareholders, and their shares do not trade in public mar-
kets.”306 The ease of identifying such small corporations and their ownership 
allows courts to seamlessly conflate individual and corporate beliefs.307 This 
conflation was apparent throughout the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hobby 
Lobby.308 This focus on smaller corporations likely reflects “our intuitions . . . 
that publicly held corporations are different from privately held ones, and that 
privately held corporations with a relatively small number of shareholders are 
different from those with a large number.”309 
                                                        
304  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 288. 
305  See supra Part IV.C. 
306  Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 279. 
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 This focus on smaller corporations throughout the literature and jurispru-
dence then begs the question of how much the size of a corporation and the di-
versity of its ownership matter. Even among those who support corporate free 
exercise rights, there may be a sense that, at some point, a corporation is simply 
too big to exercise religion.310 The extent to which we give credence to that 
sense will define the scope of free exercise rights afforded to corporations. 
 Careful consideration, however, indicates that corporate size should not 
matter because the appropriate focus is on the actions of the corporation, not 
who stands behind the corporate veil.311 Certainly a religiously diverse body of 
corporate shareholders is less likely than a unified shareholder body to exercise 
religion. This makes sense because shareholders’ varying religious voices will 
likely prevent any definite religious action in support of one particular religious 
perspective. But that does not mean that the beliefs of corporate stakeholders 
should enter the judicial considerations. For instance, it is not inconceivable 
that a religiously diverse corporate ownership could operate a kosher deli. Pro-
vided the corporation operated in accordance with religious stricture, there is no 
basis for denying it protection based on the diverse nature of its shareholders. 
Similarly, in the case of a Christian bookstore overtly dedicated to promoting 
religious ideals, why should it matter if the business is family-held or publicly 
traded? So long as the actions of the corporation itself are consistent with reli-
gious practice, the First Amendment’s protections ought to apply. Thus, while 
it may be tempting to distinguish between corporations based on their size and 
ownership structures, courts should resist that temptation and focus instead on 
the actions of the corporation itself. 
G. Sincerity Inquiries Cannot Create Definitive, Generalizable Rules 
 Despite the acceptance and use of sincerity as the operative analysis for 
evaluating free exercise claims, courts have never developed a universal and 
formal sincerity test.312 This is not surprising given that the Supreme Court has 
not even provided “a comprehensive account of what ‘religion’ means within 
the context of the First Amendment.”313 The lack of such formally stated rules 
and definitions does not mean that the entire endeavor must fail. The Supreme 
Court’s failure to define “religion” has hardly destroyed all free exercise 
claims, nor has the lack of a unifying test for sincerity rendered that test inoper-
                                                        
310  See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus 
Brief in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 21 (2014) (“It may 
be that at some point, for prudential reasons, as, for example, the number of people involved 
in the business rises, First Amendment protection becomes inappropriate.”). 
311  See Vischer, supra note 279, at 374 (“For purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, though, 
why should it matter whether the corporation is closely held or publicly traded?”); see also 
Meese & Oman, supra note 1, at 288 (writing that, for RFRA purposes, there is no basis for 
distinguishing publicly traded corporations from closely held corporations). 
312  Wilson, supra note 226, at 1453; Brady, supra note 222, at 1433. 
313  Meyler, supra note 194, at 888. 
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able.314 The lack of clarity simply means that courts must exercise their judg-
ment and discretion when applying the sincerity test. Moreover, the lack of 
clear guidance from the Supreme Court does not mean that lower courts are op-
erating in the dark. As the previous section demonstrates, there are a variety of 
established factors that courts can look to in determining the sincerity of corpo-
rate religious actors.315 
 A related problem arises, however, because “[s]incerity operates only at re-
tail. When a court or other decisionmaker rejects a claim as insincere, this will 
rarely have any precedential effect for other free exercise claims.”316 While 
true, this does not fatally undermine the use of sincerity as an assessment tool 
for free exercise claims. Courts frequently engage in fact-specific inquiries that 
may not create a generalizable bright-line rule for all contexts. A lack of gen-
eral applicability does not mean that those inquiries produce the incorrect result 
in the individual cases under consideration. Further, as more challenges are 
brought and more cases are decided, general trends begin to emerge from the 
case law. This is the common law system at work. A practical, common sense 
approach that will decide cases justly should not be rejected simply because it 
does not immediately create a bright-line rule applicable in all cases. 
H. Sincerity Determinations Discriminate Against Minority Beliefs 
 Another criticism leveled against the use of a sincerity test in general is 
that it opens the door for possible discrimination against unusual or minority 
religious beliefs. “The more unusual a claimant’s religion, the easier it will be 
for decisionmakers to conclude, on the basis of an unarticulated view that ‘no 
one could really believe this,’ that the claimant’s beliefs are not sincerely 
held.”317 Thus, adherents of well-established religious organizations are likely 
to have greater success establishing evidence of sincerity than those who sub-
scribe to less well-known beliefs.318  
Certainly this pitfall is problematic for those who advocate the sincerity 
test, but it is not fatal. First, while it may be easier for adherents to mainstream 
religions to demonstrate their sincerity, the test has been appropriately applied 
to a host of individual religious beliefs and believers. At a certain point, it be-
comes necessary to trust the courts and juries that make such determinations. 
Second, this objection applies not only to corporate religious claims, but also to 
                                                        
314  See, e.g., Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 328 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. 
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315  See supra Part IV.C. 
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317  Id. at 954 (footnote omitted). 
318  Olree, supra note 221, at 118 (explaining that in Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Amish “were 
widely known sincerely to believe that segregation from the world was an intrinsic require-
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claims brought by individuals. Accepting the objection would require rejecting 
the sincerity test in all cases. But then the question becomes: what replaces it? 
Accepting the need for some sort of gatekeeping mechanism in free exercise 
claims,319 sincerity is the best option available. Even if imperfect, sincerity pro-
vides the most fair and effective means for sorting valid religious claims from 
mere sham claims designed to obtain some other, non-religious, end. 
CONCLUSION 
 Despite the controversy surrounding the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby 
decision that for-profit corporations could assert religious exercise rights, the 
Court, for the most part, got it right. For-profit corporations do have the ability 
and the right to exercise religion. Indeed, in some ways, the Court did not go 
far enough. Corporate free exercise rights extend beyond the congressionally 
granted statutory rights in RFRA and are guaranteed by the First Amendment 
of the Constitution. A logical application of First Amendment precedent and 
policy demands such a result. 
In other ways, however, the Court’s analysis was off-base, particularly its 
apparent focus on the closely held nature of the corporations at issue and on the 
beliefs of the corporate shareholders. The proper analysis would focus on the 
sincere beliefs of the corporation itself. While not a simple endeavor, such be-
liefs can be determined through evaluation of the corporation’s overt actions as 
a corporation. Where those actions indicate a sincere commitment to a clear set 
of religious beliefs, the corporation can rightfully assert a free exercise claim 
under the First Amendment. Whether that claim will be successful is an entirely 
separate matter. But the mere fact that a corporation seeks to turn a profit 
should not be grounds to deny the corporation its day in court. Corporations, 
like individuals, have the power and right to exercise religion. In Hobby Lobby, 
the Supreme Court took the first step. This article has articulated the framework 
needed to fully vindicate corporate free exercise rights under the Constitution. 
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